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 The history of Bertolt Brecht’s play Leben des Galilei extends through the writing 
of its three versions during 1938 to 1955—a period of two decades that also encompassed 
the entirety of the Second World War.  The period also covers the atom bomb from its 
development to America’s use of the bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as the 
beginning of the Cold War, which included the sustained threat that nuclear weapons 
might be used any day.  This thesis traces, and offers interpretations of, changes in 
Brecht’s Leben des Galilei from its inception in 1938–1939—when the protagonist, a 
scientist, is portrayed in a positive light—through the play’s American version in 1947, 
where it bitterly accuses science and scientists of having betrayed society and humanity, 
and finally to its last version in 1955, where the protagonist struggles to prevent the 
normalization—the familiarization—of the threat of nuclear warfare. 
 Next to the writing of the Leben des Galilei, the thesis also focuses on the main 
critical readings of the play.  A large fraction of the critical readings, but not all of them, 
interpret the play either as a judgment of science or as an invitation to pass judgment on 
science. 
 The thesis compares Leben des Galilei with three different groups of other texts.   
The first comparison is with two other plays that also address the problem of science in 
the age of nuclear weapons, and the second comparison is with other work of Brecht 
himself.  The first comparison leads to the observation that the muted note of optimism in 
the final version of Leben des Galilei is exceptional, and the second comparison to the 
apparently unrelated observation that it was uncharacteristic of Brecht to make explicit a 
ii 
certain literary allusion in Leben des Galilei.  The two observations converge to a 
possible common explanation from a comparison with a still third group of texts, a cycle 
of Native American myths which appear in the oral traditions of various Native American 
tribes spread throughout the New World. 
 Finally, the thesis addresses the question of why a modern-day literary text, 
addressing the essentially modern problem of nuclear warfare, and addressing that 
problem using the essentially modern techniques of Brechtian theatre, might have 
structures parallel to the structures of primitive mythology.    
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INTRODUCTION: BERTOLT BRECHT’S LEBEN DES GALILEI 
 Bertolt Brecht (1898–1956) was one of the greatest playwrights of the twentieth 
century, achieving international significance both for his plays and for the progress the 
stage owes to him as a theoretician of theatre.  Leben des Galilei, on which Brecht 
worked from 1938 to his death in 1956, is widely considered his masterpiece.  It leads the 
list of Brecht’s “five great plays” (Unwin 185); it is, along with Mutter Courage und ihre 
Kinder (1941; Brecht, Die Stücke von Bertolt Brecht in einem Band, 541–578), one of 
two plays by Brecht included in a standard canon of German-language theatre (von 
Wiese 401); it has been called “Brecht’s probably most significant and most difficult 
dramatic work” (Knust 186).  In the 75 years since its first version premiered in 1943, 
Leben des Galilei has attracted a large, amorphous mass of critical opinion.  This thesis is 
an attempt to read three things: the play itself, a sampling of the critical literature about 
the play, and certain essentials of the theoretical machinery underlying the play.  Here, 
first, is a brief summary of the play: 
 In the beginning, Galileo is a professor living in Venice, and his immediate 
difficulties, pecuniary in nature, are the play’s first crisis.  He is a famous physicist, but 
his request for a raise is rejected with the explanation that the discoveries that brought 
him academic fame are not financial successes.  As a result, he must accept wealthy 
students who pay him for private lessons.  One of his private students has recently 
returned from Holland, from where he has brought back a new invention: a telescope.  
Galileo sees the telescope, copies the design, and presents it to the city fathers of Venice 
as his own new invention which should be a financial success—which should even have 
important naval applications.  Then he receives his raise. 
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 The second of three crises in Leben des Galilei begins when a shipment of Dutch 
telescopes arrive in Venice, thus exposing Galileo in his deception that he had himself 
invented the telescope.  In the meantime, however, Galileo has been using the telescope 
for astronomical observations, and he has had success of at least two kinds:  He has 
discovered a new star, and he has discovered evidence against Ptolemy’s geocentric 
model of the universe—evidence that supports the heliocentric model of Copernicus.  An 
earlier physicist, Giordano Bruno, was burnt at the stake by the Holy Inquisition for 
having taught the Copernican model.  Galileo uses the new star he has discovered to 
solve his immediate Venetian crisis:  He writes to the House of Medici in Florence, 
saying that he is naming the new star after the Grand Duke—who is only a boy—and 
requesting employment as court mathematician.  His friend warns him that, if he goes to 
Florence, then his life might not be as safe from the Inquisition as it was if he stayed in 
Venice.  Galileo ignores the warning and goes to Florence, where he must indeed agree to 
a compromise with the Inquisition:  He must stop working on astronomy.  He agrees, and 
he continues research within the limits of the agreement, studying topics that are not 
considered controversial by the religious authorities, such as the properties of floating 
bodies. 
 The third and final crisis arises when the Pope dies and a Cardinal who had 
himself studied science becomes the new Pope.  Galileo, imagining that the new Pope 
would be a patron of science, starts working on astronomy again.  The Cardinal Inquisitor 
first convinces the House of Medici to extradite Galileo to Rome, and then convinces the 
new Pope to allow the Inquisition to threaten Galileo with torture.  Galileo recants his 
teachings and spends the rest of his life under house arrest, a prisoner of the Inquisition. 
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 But the play has a coda.  A former student on his way to Holland pays Galileo a 
visit on his way out of Italy.  Galileo reveals that he has continued his research in 
captivity, and that he has been maintaining a secret copy of his resulting book, the 
Discorsi.  The former student smuggles the secret copy of Galileo’s Discorsi beyond the 
borders of Italy. 
 That is an umbrella summary of the play itself, covering all three versions, in 
which art mimics a rapidly evolving reality.  Brecht worked on Leben des Galilei, on and 
off, from 1938 to his death in 1956, working under different circumstances, in different 
countries—one can even say in different worlds—and in different languages, writing the 
play three times over in the process.  For the second version, written in English, his 
collaborator was the great British-American actor Charles Laughton (1899–1962), a 
master of the art of theatre in his own right.  The first chapter of this thesis recounts, in 
brief, the story of the writing of the three versions of the play, including an account of the 
changes in the play from one version to the next. 
 One reason why the play changes over the versions is that it was begun on the eve 
of the Second World War, but Brecht continued reworking it for the rest of his life.  Thus 
the play changed in response to the dropping of the atom bombs on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, and again in response to the sustained threat, even after the Second World War 
was over, of the use of nuclear weapons in the Cold War.  Many of the critical readings 
of Leben des Galilei focus upon its interpretation as a statement about science, scientists, 
and scientific ethics—a statement informed by the lethal developments in modern 
physics.  However, like all great works of art, Brecht’s play is open enough to afford a 
plethora of other readings as well.  The second chapter of this thesis is an account of 
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various critical readings of the play, with a thorough account of the literature that 
interprets the play as a statement on science, and a selection of miscellaneous extra-
scientific readings of the play. 
 The third chapter is an original analysis of Leben des Galilei in three parts.  The 
first part of the analysis compares the play with two other plays, Die Physiker (1961) by 
Friedrich Dürrenmatt (1921–1990) and Biedermann und die Brandstifter (1958) by Max 
Frisch (1911–1991).  The analysis determines difference along the optimism-pessimism 
axis to be one essential way in which Leben des Galilei differs from the plays by 
Dürrenmatt and Frisch, then goes on to speculate about the possible reasons for the 
difference.   
The second part of the analysis again compares Leben des Galilei with other 
plays, but uses Brecht’s own other work for the contrast; in other words, the second part 
of the analysis determines one way in which Brecht varied from his own lifelong usual 
practice when he wrote Leben des Galilei.  Specifically, in Leben des Galilei, Brecht 
alludes to a literary source—Horace’s Satire 1.8—explicitly, which is uncharacteristic of 
Brecht.   
The ultimate observations of the first and the second parts of the comparative 
analysis appear unrelated.  The third and final part of the analysis, then, connects the two 
observations by suggesting a common explanation for them.  The common explanation is 
based on a new connection between Leben des Galilei and a cycle of animal myths from 
various Native American tribes throughout North America and South America.  
 It is, of course, not being suggested that Brecht consciously wrote Native 
American mythology into his play.  In fact, there is no evidence to suggest that Brecht 
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ever even heard of the specific cycle of myths in question.  And it is not being suggested 
either that all texts somehow have the same underlying structure—such a hypothesis 
would almost certainly be a naïve oversimplification.  The question arises, then, about the 
reason why Leben des Galilei has the same structure as the cycle of Native American 
myths.  The fourth and concluding chapter of this thesis attempts to explain the latent 
mythic structure in Leben des Galilei.  Specifically, the chapter argues that the reason 
mythic structures appear in the Brecht play may be that mythic thought is universal.  In 
other words, that, due to its long history of revision, Leben des Galilei became refined to 
a point where it had to arrive at universal truths.  The play acquired the structure of myths 
because myths too, being continuously retold, contain universal truths.  Read in the 
reverse, the same argument can count as a simultaneous argument, based on the 
convergence of Leben des Galilei and the cycle of myths, for the authenticity and the 
universality of both the play and the mythology.  If two people working independently on 
the same problem arrive at the same answer, it is evidence that their common answer is 
correct; similarly, the shared structure of Leben des Galilei and the Native American 




 [A note about terminology:  Throughout this thesis, Galileo—with italics—
denotes Brecht’s play, whereas Galileo—without italics—denotes the protagonist of the 
play.  No part of this thesis alludes to the historic Renaissance scientist on whom the 
protagonist is based.] 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE WRITING OF LEBEN DES GALILEI  
 Bertolt Brecht’s Leben des Galilei went through three full iterations of writing 
and production between 1939 and 1955.  The original version, with 15 scenes, was titled 
Galileo Galilei, written in 1938–39 in Denmark, and premiered on September 9, 1943, at 
the Schauspielhaus in Zürich; the second version, completed in 1945–46, opened in the 
summer of 1947 in Beverly Hills.  Brecht finished the third version in Berlin in 1955, 
with its premiere at the Städtische Bühnen in Köln on April 16 the same year (Frenzel 
and Frenzel 623).  The playwright would continue to return to Galilei throughout the last 
two turbulent decades of his life.  
 Indeed, the turbulence of those two decades may have been a reason why Brecht 
substantially rewrote the play each time it was produced.  As one commentator 
perceptively puts it, “Like Goethe, who worked on Faust throughout his life, Brecht kept 
returning to the play and revising it in the light of - or, more appropriately - darkness of 
what was happening to Europe and the world at large” (Harman 116).  A text might, 
presumably, change in response to changes in its context, especially if the changes in its 
context are violent in nature.  And, at a more immediate and personal level, the violence 
of history drove the playwright literally right around his troubled world as he worked.  
The completions of the three versions—in 1939, 1947, and 1955 respectively—fell in 
three different periods of history and of Brecht’s personal life:  “Brecht himself was at 
first living as an exile, close to Germany, on the eve of an impending war; he rewrote the 
play once in the aura of Hollywood, when an allied victory was at last certain, then again 
after his own successful reestablishment in his country, within a bitterly divided world” 
(Brecht, Collected Plays, 265–266; see also Esslin 54 et seq.).  And it is, of course, 
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probable that these late-life Wanderjahre, forced upon Brecht by world history, 
influenced the twenty-year evolution of Leben des Galilei.   
Similar to Brecht’s being hounded out of Germany, then across Russia to 
America, and finally back to East Berlin with a stop in Zürich, the 1930s and the 1940s 
also saw tumultuous change on the simultaneous and lethally related level of physics.  
The story of the atom bomb, from its birth in 1938, to its coming of age in the Pacific 
Ocean theater of World War II in 1945, on to the testing of the hydrogen bomb in 
Enewetak Atoll in 1952, paralleled the writing of the three versions of Leben es Galilei:  
“During Brecht’s work on the first version, it became known that Niels Bohr had split the 
uranium atom; while he and [Charles] Laughton [1899–1962] were preparing the second,  
the first atom bomb dropped on Hiroshima” (Brecht, Collected Plays, 265), and it is more 
than likely that the bomb directly impacted the play.  At least one commentator considers 
it a certainty:  “Es ist kein Zweifel möglich, daß Brecht sein Urteil über Galilei und die 
geschichtliche Bedeutung seiner wissenschaftlichen Entdeckungen unter dem Eindruck 
der Atombombe änderte” (Rohrmoser, “Brecht ∙ Das Leben des Galilei,” 404; see also 
Rohrmoser, “Brecht’s Galileo,” 118).  The developments in nuclear physics constituted 
an integral part of the context of Leben des Galilei.  In fact, this part of the context is 
what Brecht seems to have chosen to foreground in his text. 
Beyond the circumstances—both his own and his world’s—Brecht must also have 
been influenced by certain factors that affect every play, even plays with less dramatic 
contexts than Leben des Galilei, factors such as the company of actors at hand for 
production when he wrote each of the three versions in 1939, 1947, and 1955:  “[Galileo] 
was first written with no clear prospect of production, then rewritten for a specific actor, 
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Laughton, and a specific production before an American audience, then rewritten once 
more for Brecht’s own Berliner Ensemble to play in East Berlin” (Brecht, Collected 
Plays, 265).  Playwrights have always been sensitive to the actors in their company, but 
Brecht was known for taking the matter of the text’s sensitivity to actors to an extreme, 
where decisions about his plays were not simply his own decisions, but rather had to be 
consensus decisions, decisions of which his whole company had to take ownership.  For 
example, Ernest Borneman (1915–1995), in the course of a combined review of two 
books on Brecht (Martin Esslin’s Brecht: A Choice of Evils and John Willett’s The 
Theatre of Bertolt Brecht), recounts his own experience of acting for Brecht:  “Here I can 
speak from personal knowledge, for it was that year, as a child actor in Der Jasager, that 
I met Brecht for the first time.  He asked us if we agreed with the boy’s self-sacrifice and 
we said no.  So he rewrote the play with a different ending and called it Der Neinsager” 
(Borneman 480).  For a playwright with such a writing process, it is only to be expected 
that the text would change when he first wrote in 1939 with no specific bodies to wear 
the play’s various roles, then rewrote it in 1947 for one of the biggest stars among the 
actors of his generation, and finally rewrote it again in 1955 for his own company in post-
war East Berlin.  The second version belongs as much to Laughton as to the atom bomb, 
and the final version owes at least as much to the Berliner Ensemble as to the hydrogen 
bomb. 
 The most obvious surface change from one version to the next was, of course, that 
of languages—German in 1939, English in 1947, and German again in 1955—“[Galileo] 
was written in German, then entirely rewritten in English (with Brecht himself 
contributing in a mixture of English and German), then rewritten in German again largely 
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on the basis of the English-language version” (Brecht, Collected Plays, 265).  Not that 
Brecht would compromise his text on account of difficulties expressing himself—that 
would be quite out of question for a master playwright of Brecht’s stature and ego.  But it 
is possible that Brecht, living in America, might have been working directly in English 
when he rewrote Leben des Galilei for Laughton, and that he, as a result of the new 
language of his work, visualized his play differently, discovering different points and 
different points of view.  When he worked in German again on the third version, his line 
of thought must have changed again, but the intermediate period of working in English 
cannot have failed to have left an aftereffect—he saw everything in German again, but 
could not unsee what he had seen in English before.  The hypothesis here is that human 
mind can express itself differently when thinking in a different language.  This idea goes 
at least as far back as Wilhelm von Humboldt in the early 19th century:  “[Der Sprachen] 
Verschiedenheit ist nicht eine von Schällen und Zeichen, sondern eine Verschiedenheit 
der Weltansichten selbst” (27); a more recent, experimental investigation of this 
phenomenon found that even bilingual subjects think and remember differently when 
working in different languages (Boroditsky et al 138–140), which suggests that using a 
different language might affect not only the language user’s relatively permanent 
Weltansichten, but also, minute by minute, the language user’s train of thought.  In other 
words, the same person can, conceivably, have different personalities, working 
differently when working in different languages—when conducting his or her internal 
monologue in different languages.    In this way, the switching of the text’s language 
back and forth between German and English, too, must have contributed to the changes 
among the three versions of Leben des Galilei. 
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 The above possible factors that took Leben des Galilei through its multiple 
rewritings are all briefly discussed in Brecht’s Collected Plays (265–266, see also Willett, 
The Theatre of Bertolt Brecht, 68 et seq.).  Because the possible factors are so numerous, 
there would be little point in trying to attribute specific changes among the play’s three 
versions to specific possible factors.  But another factor may, as well, have been 
responsible for Brecht’s changes in the text: the different amounts of time that he spent 
working on each of the three different versions.  Brecht completed the first version in a 
matter of weeks—begun in November 1938, drafted in a mere 16 days, revised a few 
weeks after, and finished by February 1939 (Brecht, Collected Plays, 266–267; 
Schumacher, Drama und Geschichte: Bertolt Brechts ›Leben des Galilei‹ und andere 
Stücke, 18–20).  When it came to the 1947 version, in contrast, Brecht and Charles 
Laughton had started it by December 1944, and worked for almost a year up to December 
1945 (Brecht, Collected Plays, 268; Schumacher, Drama und Geschichte: Bertolt Brechts 
›Leben des Galilei‹ und andere Stücke, 142–143).  As for the third version of 1955:   
 [W]hen Ernst Busch, horrified at the length of the Galileo rehearsals, objected  
that at this rate it would take four years to put it all together, Brecht slyly replied 
that four years would not be so bad at that, and in general, observers have always 
remarked that the benefit of state sponsorship for the Brecht theatre was very 
precisely this lack of any time pressure, this ideal of thoroughness in which no 
problem is too small for discussion, no gesture too insignificant for explication 
and criticism/self-criticism. (Jameson, Brecht and Method, 142). 
Thus the three versions took progressively longer to complete.  This may seem 
paradoxical, because in 1939 Brecht was writing with no stage production in sight.  One 
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reason why Brecht may have needed longer to complete the later versions is the “ideal of 
thoroughness” (ibid.) that gains in relevance precisely when a play is produced.  
More specifically, when working with successive versions of the same play, 
Brecht may have needed longer because he may have been trying to solve stubborn, 
enduring problems that he identified, yet could not completely solve in earlier versions of 
the text.  And, in Brecht’s own view, both of the first two versions did have such 
problems:  He wrote that the first version of Leben des Galilei was “a great step 
backwards, far too opportunist …  The play would need to be completely rewritten to 
convey that ‘breeze that comes from new shores,’ that rosy dawn of science.  It would all 
have to be more direct, without the interiors, the atmospherics, the empathy” (Brecht, 
Collected Plays, 267; see also Kruger 37 and Schumacher, Drama und Geschichte: 
Bertolt Brechts ›Leben des Galilei‹ und andere Stücke, 19).  Brecht felt the second 
version was “still … formally conventional” (Brecht, Collected Plays, 269), specifically, 
that “with its interiors and atmospheric effects the construction of the scenes, derived 
from the epic theatre, makes a singularly theatrical impact” (Brecht, Collected Plays, 
269; Schumacher, Drama und Geschichte: Bertolt Brechts ›Leben des Galilei‹ und 
andere Stücke, 144).  For the 1947 production, Brecht “tried in vain to get [his childhood 
friend and regular scene designer Caspar] Neher [1897–1962] over from Europe” 
(Willett, Brecht in Context, 141), and the failure of the attempt to bring Neher to America 
may have been a reason why Brecht was unhappy with the scenes (see Browning 114, 
Davison 108, and Zipser 100 for the way a modern production of Leben des Galilei 
approached the problem; see also Stegmann 133 and Spencer 53 for accounts of other 
modern productions’ approaches).  Brecht was, already since Die Dreigroschenoper 
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(1928; Brecht, Die Stücke von Bertolt Brecht in einem Band, 165–202), wary of 
theatricalness, of “entheater[ing] (eintheatern) everything” (Vaßen, “Die Alterität des 
Zuschauers. Das Theater braucht Widerstand - Bertolt Brechts Kritik am ‘Eintheatern,’” 
74–75).  Thus Leben des Galilei undoubtedly changed simply because each version was 
based on more deliberation on the playwright’s part than the earlier version(s).  And 
Brecht may have, as his career matured, spent more and more time on the play because he 
wanted to solve every last remaining problem with the play.   
And, as a final possible factor that may have affected the play’s evolution, it 
seems certain that Brecht had big plans for Leben des Galilei from the very beginning.  
Already in January 1939, when he was still working the first version—with no stage 
production in sight—he said in a newspaper interview that the play was “really written 
for New York” (Brecht, Collected Plays, 267; Schumacher, Drama und Geschichte: 
Bertolt Brechts ›Leben des Galilei‹ und andere Stücke, 19).  A reference to his desire to 
produce the play on Broadway suggests that, since at least 1939, Brecht, increasingly 
mindful of his legacy, of his own place in history, selected Leben des Galilei—whether 
consciously or unconsciously—for his magnum opus.  And, in time, Brecht’s selection of 
Leben des Galilei as his magnum opus might have become a reason why he embarked on 
a personal, two-decade quest for perfection.  This particular play may have been chosen 
to be Brecht’s last statement to—and about—the world.  His choice may explain the great 
amount of care the playwright took with the text; his choice may also explain why the 
play had to keep changing as the playwright and the world changed:  At each new stage, 
the play needed to change because it needed to become the final statement of a new, 
changed man to—and about—a new, changed world. 
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 Thus a wide variety of factors all contributed to changing the text of Leben des 
Galilei over the course of twenty years, and the three versions are records of that 
changing text at three points in history.  An account of the writing of Leben des Galilei 
should engage with all versions of it, and with all of the changes from one version to the 
next.  A variorum edition of Brecht, which would provide a record of all surviving 
versions—including manuscript versions—has been discussed since at least 1968 (Zuther 
422), but, unfortunately, it has yet to materialize.  The closest thing to a variorum edition 
so far is a tabular, scene-by-scene summary of the third version which includes, next to 
its summary of each scene, brief statements of the various ways in which the text differs 
in that scene from the two earlier versions (in Danter).  This tabular summary is written 
in reverse chronological order, i.e. from a reader’s point of view:  It is an attempt to 
represent the journey of a reader who first encounters the final (1955) version, then 
excavates the text to see what it used to be in the 1947 version, and finally digs even 
deeper for the text’s original form in the 1939 version.   
For the purposes of this chapter—an historical account of the writing of Leben des 
Galilei—the relevant point of view is, however, the opposite:  This chapter looks at the 
text from the point of view of the playwright, from which one can see how Brecht 
himself discovered the text, progressing from the earlier versions to the final one.  In 
other words, this chapter calls for a chronological summary of the different versions, and 
the remainder of this chapter traces such a summary, not with immediate commentary, 
but rather to serve as the object of analysis and commentary in the subsequent chapters. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the following will serve as primary texts: an early 
sketch—in the form of a list, from November 1938—which we shall call version zero, 
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that appears in Brecht’s Collected Plays (p. 266); the 1939 version, as discussed in 
outline in Brecht’s Collected Plays (pp. 270–296); the 1947 version, Galileo, first 
published 1952, as printed in the appendix to Brecht’s Collected Plays (pp. 403–467); 
and the 1955 version, Leben des Galilei, first published 1957, as printed in Brecht’s Die 
Stücke von Bertolt Brecht in einem Band (pp. 491–539).  The record of the text’s 
evolution will contribute toward the text’s interpretations in the later chapters.  The 
section headings below, including the numbering, the capitalization, the abbreviation, and 
the punctuation, are, verbatim, the entries of the list that constitutes version zero of 1938, 
and each section briefly describes, in chronological order, the main ways in which Brecht 
transformed its material as he wrote the first (1939), second (1947), and third (1955) 
versions of the play.  
 
1.  PADUA/Welcoming the new age/Copernicus’s hypothesis/authoritarian economy 
in Italy. 
 In the 1939 version, the first scene has Galileo speaking about the “new age” and 
explaining the heliocentric model of Copernicus to his pupil Andrea, who is also his 
housekeeper’s son.  Galileo receives Priuli, the procurator of the university.  Doppone, a 
prospective student from an aristocratic family, shows Galileo a telescope newly brought 
from Holland. 
 In the 1947 version, the scene is shorter.  Galileo’s speech is shorter, and he does 
not explain the heliocentric model to Andrea.  The first visitor, Ludovico Marsili, from an 
aristocratic family, who seeks to be a student, introduces the telescope.  Afterward, Priuli 
visits Galileo.   
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 In the 1955 version, the order of appearance of the characters is the same as in the 
second version, as are as their identities.  In particular, the second version’s condensation 
of the characters of Doppone and Ludovico into Ludovico is retained, and Ludovico 
remains an aristocrat, like Doppone and unlike the first version’s Ludovico.  On the other 
hand, the scene is much more thoroughly developed than in the second version:  Galileo’s 
explanation of the Copernican model to Andrea is restored; Galileo’s speech is expanded 
with even more detail than in the first version. 
 
2.  SIGNORIA/Landscape. 
 In the 1939 version, Galileo, accompanied by Andrea, who carries the telescope, 
and Priuli, presents the telescope to the city fathers of Venice.  Priuli speaks about its 
possible military applications and adds that Galileo hopes to continue serving Venice.  At 
the end of the scene, Doppone barges in and berates Galileo, saying that the telescope’s 
cover should have been green. 
 In the 1947 version, Virginia appears in this scene, carrying the telescope; 
Ludovico is present from the beginning.  Priuli introduces Matti, an iron founder from 
Florence.  The scene ends the same way as in the first version, with Ludovico speaking 
what used to be Doppone’s line—that Galileo merely changed the colour of the 
telescope’s cover from green to red.   
 The 1955 version does away with the character of Matti—indeed, it does not 
introduce the idea of Florence in this scene at all.  Instead, the character of Federzoni, 
lens-grinder and assistant to Galileo, appears.  And, once again, the scene is fleshed out 
in far richer detail than in the second version. 
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3.  RESEARCH/Danger of the truth/speech about reason and its seductions. 
 In all three versions, Galileo discovers, in this scene, proof for the Copernican 
model.  Galileo’s friend Sagredo warns him that such research could bring persecution.  
Priuli arrives to say it has been found out that the telescope had already been discovered 
in Holland.  Galileo, disregarding Sagredo’s advice, writes to Florence. 
 For this scene, the difference between the three versions is the extent to which the 
dialogue is developed.  The 1947 version is, yet again, the shortest by far, and the 1955 
version is the most well-developed of the three.  
 
4.  DEMONSTRATIONS/The addicts of authority exhorted to see. 
 In the 1939 version, the fourth scene starts with Andrea and Cosmo fighting, and 
continues with court scholars looking through the telescope.  At the scene’s end, the 
plague is in Florence, and a carriage is on its way to take Galileo’s household away. 
 In the 1947 version, this scene too becomes much shorter, and the fight between 
Andrea and Cosmo does not happen.  Galileo invites the court scholars to look through 
the telescope themselves, but there is no mention of the plague. 
 In the 1955 version, the fight between Andrea and Cosmo is restored, but the 
plague is not.  And, as with the previous scenes, here too Brecht develops the whole 
scene in greater detail than in either of the first two versions. 
 In the 1947 version, Brecht and Laughton introduced almost every scene with 
brief song, the only exceptions being this scene and the later scene between Pope Urban 
VIII and the Cardinal Inquisitor.  In the 1955 version, Brecht translated into German all 
of the preludes already present in 1947, but only this scene, scene four, got two brand-
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new lines of lyric prelude.  The following scene—scene five, plague—which was cut for 
1947, has no prelude in the 1955 version; the scene between The Pope and the Cardinal 
remains without a prelude in the 1955 version.  
 
5.  PLAGUE. 
 In the 1939 version, Brecht already introduces the plague at the end of the 
previous scene.  This scene shows Galileo staying back, in spite of the plague, in order to 
continue his research. 
In the 1947 version, the plague is completely cut.  The fifth scene of the second 
version is the evaluation of the Copernican system at the Collegium Romanorum.   
In the 1955 version, Brecht divides scene 5 into two sub-scenes.  5a shows the 
arrival of the plague in Florence, with a carriage coming to take Galileo’s household 
away from the city, but Galileo stays behind, with Frau Sarti staying back to look after 
him; 5b has the same content as the fifth scene of the first version. 
 
6.  COLLEGIUM ROMANUM/The Copernican system ridiculed. 
 In the 1939 version, the sixth scene has the Collegium Romanorum confirming 
that Galileo’s discoveries are correct.  The scene ends with an astronomer pointing out 
Galileo to the Cardinal Inquisitor, who considers Galileo’s telescope to be a very 
interesting instrument. 
 In the 1947 version, this scene too—which is the fifth scene, because the plague 
was cut—becomes much shorter.  Much of the preliminary dialogue is left out, and the 
scene ends with the short monk telling Galileo, “You have won.” 
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 In the 1955 version, the first version is restored and revised.  Galileo answers the 
short monk, saying that it is not he, but reason that has won.  The end of the scene has a 
switch from the first version:  The doorman tells Galileo that the man who just entered 
the room is the Cardinal Inquisitor.   
 
7.  THE DECREE/On the church’s responsibilities/the ch. System too all-
embracing. 
 In the 1939 version, the seventh scene—the ball scene—features Doppone again, 
and also introduces Virginia’s fiancé Ludovico, who is not an aristocrat but a commoner.  
Church officials—Cardinal Bellarmine in a fox’s costume and Cardinal Barberini as a 
donkey—confront Galileo, informing him that the church has issued a decree against the 
Copernican model.  The Cardinal Inquisitor appears at the end of the scene. 
 In the 1947 version, this scene too—the sixth scene—becomes shorter, but not as 
drastically shorter as many of the preceding scenes.  Ludovico, the student from an 
aristocratic family from the first scene, is newly engaged to Virginia; another change is in 
the animal symbolism:  Cardinal Bellarmine is a lamb and Cardinal Barberini a dove. 
 The 1955 version is, once again, slightly longer than the first version, one addition 
being the madrigal of Lorenzo de Medici.  The two cardinals’ costumes match the ones in 
the American version:  Bellarmine is still a lamb, and Barberini is still a dove.  
 
7a. CONVERSATION/The monk’s parents/Horace. 
 Already in the 1939 version, this became its own scene, separate from the ball 
scene.  Galileo receives the short monk as a visitor, and they have a conversation about 
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science and religion.  They also talk about the monk’s parents, who are peasants.  Galileo 
alludes to Horace’s satire 1.8 (see the appendix for the full text of the satire in Horace’s 
original Latin; a classic English translation, in prose, is included in the second section of 
chapter three below).  
 In the 1947 version, Horace’s satire is still mentioned, but the allusion is not 
elaborated upon.  The allusion and its detailed development are fully restored in the 1955 
version. 
 
8.  The sunspots/On science/Keunos. 
 In the 1939 version, scene nine opens with Galileo experimenting with floating 
bodies.  Mucius, who has written a book against the Copernican model, is dismissed by 
Galileo.  Virginia and Frau Sarti talk about horoscopes in anticipation of Virginia’s 
wedding.  Andrea asks about sunspots, and an elderly scholar questions the ethics of 
remaining silent.  Galileo responds, parabolically, “about the man who was asked if he 
would serve his enemy, served him for seven years till he died, and then bundled up his 
corpse, scrubbed out the room, breathed deeply and replied, ‘No’” (Brecht, Collected 
Plays, 281).  Everyone laughs, with the sole exception of Andrea, who does not like the 
story.  
 In the 1947 version, scene eight begins with the conversation about horoscopes 
between Virginia and Frau Sarti.  Mucius does not appear, and the parable of the way 
Keunos refused to serve his enemy is also cut.  In the final version, the order of the events 
in scene nine is as in the American version.  In the 1955 version, Brecht restores 
Galileo’s exchange with Mucius, but leaves out the parable about Keunos refusing to 
20 
serve his enemy.  The Keunos parable cut from this scene appears today as part of the 
third entry (9–10) in Geschichten vom Herrn Keuner, another lifelong project of Brecht, 
on which he worked from 1935 to his death—even longer than he worked on Leben des 
Galilei. 
 
9.  The new age without fear/strict research/hope in working people. 
 Already in the 1939 version, this is not a separate scene, but combined into one 
scene together with the material of the previous section.  Thus, scene nine of the 1939 
and 1955 versions, and scene eight of the 1947 version, all continue with Ludovico 
bringing news that Cardinal Barberini, a scientist, is becoming the new pope.  Hearing 
this, Galileo immediately abandons the study of floating bodies to take up the subject of 
sunspots, causing Ludovico to break off his engagement to Virginia.  Galileo speaks 
about writing not in Latin, but instead in the vernacular, so that the common people could 
read what he would write. 
 
9a. BALLAD. 
 In all three versions, this is a separate scene in its own right—scene 10 in the 
1939 and 1955 versions, scene nine in the 1947 version.  Street performers perform a 
ballad about “Galileo, the Bible killer” (Brecht, Collected Plays, 447) and how his work 
transforms the world for everyone, and the common people listen.  Brecht abandoned the 
ballad from the 1939 version, writing a fresh ballad—with a completely different 
structure—for the English-language version, and the 1955 version translated the English-
language ballad to German. 
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10. THE INQUISITION’S SUMMONS. 
 In the 1939 version, scene 11 has Galileo and Virginia waiting long at the Medici 
palace to see Cosmo de Medici and give him Galileo’s book.  Gaffone, the rector of the 
university, passes but barely greets Galileo.  Galliardo, director of the artillery equipment, 
passes but he too—uncharacteristically for him—does not greet Galileo.  A student who 
wants to stop and speak with Galileo is led away by his tutor.  The Cardinal Inquisitor 
passes.  Then Cosmo de Medici appears, but he snubs Galileo by leaving without 
accepting the book.  The scene closes with a palace official coming up to Galileo and 
informing him that the Florentine court can no longer shield him from the Inquisition, 
that he is being extradited to Rome right away. 
 In the 1947 version, neither Galliardo nor the student appear in scene 10, but 
Matti, the Florentine iron founder from scene two, appears and expresses the working 
people’s support for Galileo.  Galileo tells Virginia that he might travel to Padua, where 
Sagredo has invited him to visit.  Next, the Lord Chamberlain appears, tells Galileo that 
Cosmo de Medici does not have time to see him.  Galileo tells Virginia that they are 
going to escape from Florence in a coach that is waiting for them at the house of a lens-
grinder, but, before they can leave, the Lord Chamberlain re-appears and tells them that 
they are being extradited to Rome. 
 In the 1955 version, where scene two did not feature a Florentine named Matti, 
the exchange with an iron founder is retained, even developed out to be twice as long as 
in the second version, but features a fresh character named Vanni.  Cosmo de Medici 
does appear and leave without the book.  Otherwise, scene 11 is the similar to scene 10 of 
the second version.  
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11. INQUISITION/Condemnation of doubt. 
 In the 1939 version, scene 12 has two parts.  The first part has Pope Urban VIII, 
formerly Cardinal Barberini, and the Cardinal Inquisitor arguing about Galileo’s fate.  
They reach a compromise where Galileo is to be threatened with torture, but not tortured, 
and they are sure that the threats would be sufficient to make Galileo recant.  The second 
part shows Galileo, detained in a room by two officials, waiting with the hope of an 
audience with the pope before the inquisition begins. 
 Scene 11 of the 1947 version shortens the part with the pope and the Cardinal 
Inquisitor, and completely does away with the part that showed Galileo in his cell.  Scene 
12 of the 1955 version develops the first part in better detail, but it does not restore the 
second part. 
 
12. RECANTATION/Praise of steadfastness. 
 Scene 13 in the 1939 and 1955 versions, and scene 12 in the 1947 version, are 
identical except for minor line revision and re-arrangement of dialogue.  Galileo’s 
disciples await the result of the inquisition; Galileo recants, and Andrea accuses him of 
having betrayed science. 
 
13. THE PRISONER/Passage from the Discorsi/On the scientist’s duty/On 
expropriation/The new age, a harridan. 
 In the 1939 version, scene 14 shows that Galileo, who is in house arrest, has set 
up a system to smuggle out his writings with a stove fitter.  The Inquisition is aware that 
his writings are reaching foreign countries, and has, recently, even intercepted a letter to 
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Strasbourg promising a new manuscript.  The stove fitter brings back a manuscript, 
saying that one of his men has been arrested.  A doctor visits Galileo.  Andrea, on his 
way to Holland, visits Galileo, whom he still accuses of intellectual betrayal.  Galileo 
gives Andrea the Discorsi to smuggle out of Italy, and Andrea leaves with the 
manuscript. 
 Scene 13 of the 1947 version has neither the stove fitter nor the doctor, Galileo is 
not already smuggling his papers to foreign countries, and the Inquisition does not 
suspect anything.  Andrea receives the Discorsi to smuggle out to Holland, and 
experiences a moment of revelation where he sees Galileo’s recantation as an act of 
heroism in the service of science.  Galileo, however, does not consider his own actions 
heroic. 
 Scene 14 of the 1955 version is similar to scene 13 of the second version, but, 
again, developed in better detail.  When Andrea visits, the dialogue is more about social 
betrayal than about intellectual betrayal; Galileo speaks of a version of the Hippocratic 
Oath for scientists—this is one part of the play that changed in response to developments 
in the field of nuclear warfare.  
 
14. SMUGGLING. 
 Scene 15 of the 1939 and 1955 versions, and scene 14 of the 1947 version, are 
essentially the same. In all three versions, the “harridan” planned for the penultimate 
scene in version zero is moved to this scene.  Andrea successfully crosses the Italian 
border with the manuscript of Galileo’s Discorsi, making it possible to read the play as a 
text ending on an optimistic note.    
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The above, then, is an outline of the changes in Leben des Galilei, from one 
version to the next, over three versions.  The next order of business is to interpret the 




CHAPTER TWO: THE READINGS OF LEBEN DES GALILEI 
 Brecht’s Leben des Galilei has received ample critical attention over the course of 
its 80-year history.  This chapter summarizes some of the major critical interpretations of 
the play. 
 Leben des Galilei offers multiple readings spanning a wide variety of themes, but 
a substantial part of the critical literature about the play reads it as a dialogue about the 
atom bomb (as do a number of stage productions—see, for example, Ohlson 164).  In 
view of the critical emphasis on modern physics as a theme in the play, this chapter is 
organized in two sections.  The first of these sections describes various theorists’ readings 
of Leben des Galilei as a statement about nuclear weapons, and the second section 
presents critical readings that relate it to an assortment of themes other than nuclear 
weapons.  These extra-scientific themes include possible symbolic interpretations of the 
Church as it appears in Leben des Galilei, the role of sensual pleasures as a force driving 
the title character, flight from persecution and life in exile, and political statements.  
 
 SCIENCE AND SCIENTISTS ACCORDING TO LEBEN DES GALILEI 
 The first critic of any piece of literary writing is, of course, its author.  On the 
question of what Leben des Galilei has to say about science and scientists, Brecht himself 
wrote at least twice—once before 1945, when the first atom bomb was dropped, and once 
again after the war. 
 Writing in 1941, Brecht describes Galileo in definitely positive terms:  “My 
Galileo is a powerful physicist with a tummy on him, a face like Socrates, a vociferous, 
full-blooded man with a sense of humor, the new type of physicist, earthly, a great 
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teacher” (Brecht, “The New Type of Physicist;” see also Brecht, “Der neue 
Physikertyp”).  This Galileo is a man in his prime, yet he is not a hero, but rather entirely 
human; Brecht also explicitly labels him the “new type of physicist,” i.e. Brecht intends 
Galileo as a representation of the pioneers of nuclear physics, contemporaries of Brecht, 
who were splitting the atom even as Brecht worked on the 1939 version of Leben des 
Galilei.  The sketch continues to cover the scientist’s appearance and non-verbal 
behaviour:  “Favorite attitude: stomach thrust forward, both hands on the buttocks, head 
back, using one meaty hand all the time to gesticulate with, but with precision; 
comfortable trousers for working in, shirtsleeves or (particularly at the end) a long 
whitish-yellow robe with broad sleeves, tied with a cord around his stomach” (Brecht, 
“The New Type of Physicist;” see also Brecht, “Der neue Physikertyp”).  If this 
description is reminiscent of the exaggeratedly stylized characters of commedia dell’arte, 
the paradox is that Brecht is actually writing with the express purpose of preventing a 
stylization—a different stylization—of his title character:  “It’s important that you 
shouldn’t idealize Galileo.  You know the kind of thing—the stargazer, the pallid 
intellectualized idealist.  I know you wouldn’t if left to yourself, but the pictures you’ll 
see in the books are already idealized” (Brecht, “The New Type of Physicist;” see also 
Brecht, “Der neue Physikertyp”).   
Brecht is trying to break the stereotype of the ivory-tower scientist by staging a 
Galileo full of life’s force and in touch with the working class.  And he emphasizes that 
Galileo the character must have a prominent lighter side:  “Don’t be scared of a little 
humor.  History without humor is a ghastly thing” (Brecht, “The New Type of Physicist;” 
see also Brecht, “Der neue Physikertyp”).  The humour, of course, would also serve to 
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make sure that Galileo becomes human, as opposed to a superhuman hero.  The one thing 
that is conspicuous by its absence in Brecht’s 1941 conception of Galileo, though, is the 
ominous note to the effect that mass death and destruction are a possible result of 
advances in science. 
 By the time Brecht revisited the question of Galileo’s character in 1947—after the 
war had ended with two atom bombs—the direction of his thought had turned away from 
a wish to show the “new type of physicist” on his stage in a positive light.  Of course 
Galileo’s decision to recant his teachings on astronomy when confronted by the 
Inquisition still had the positive consequence that Galileo lived to continue his work.  
This meant the recantation had the paradoxical effect of actually advancing science.  
Brecht does acknowledge this positive consequence of the recantation.  However, he is 
still sharply critical of Galileo’s decision to recant.  He emphasizes the social 
consequences, and finds the consequences disastrous: 
 The fact is that Galileo enriched astronomy and physics by simultaneously  
robbing these sciences of a greater part of their social importance.  By discrediting  
the Bible and the church, these sciences stood for a while at the barricades on  
behalf of all progress.  It is true that a forward movement took place in the  
following centuries, and these sciences were involved in it, but it was a slow  
movement, not a revolution; the scandal, so to speak, degenerated into a dispute  
between experts.  The church, with all its forces of reaction, was able to bring off  
an organized retreat and more or less reassert its power.  (Brecht, “Praise or  
Condemnation of Galileo?” 225; see also Brecht, “Preis oder Verdammung des  
Galilei?” 12) 
28 
Brecht, in 1947, is mindful of the price at which Galileo purchased his life and his 
opportunity to continue his work:  Had Galileo refused to recant, had Galileo been burnt 
at the stake, the common people could have revolted, because, as previously established 
in the scene with the ballad, Galileo’s work had already spread among the common 
people—and the revolution could have delivered the common people from the oppression 
of the Church’s authority.  And Brecht, in 1947, is contemptuous of what was salvaged 
by Galileo’s decision:  Galileo, subsequent to his recantation, only worked in secret, and, 
because his new writings were only available to scientists in foreign countries, it all 
“degenerated into a dispute between experts,” i.e. science was, once again, confined to 
precisely the type of “pallid intellectualized idealist” that Brecht earlier—in 1941—had 
wanted to replace with his Galileo (Brecht, “The New Type of Physicist;” see also 
Brecht, “Der neue Physikertyp”).  Science was once again confined to the ivory tower—
symbolized by Galileo being confined to house arrest by the Inquisition—and the cruel 
irony is that Galileo made a conscious, deliberate decision go into confinement and 
continue to live, when he could have, instead, chosen to die, in which case science would 
have still been free, could have still been among the common people, and the natural 
course of that free science could have brought down the Church.  In other words, Brecht 
accuses Galileo of sacrificing the possibility of a revolution in order to preserve his own 
life, and also of allowing the Church to survive in order to preserve his own life, when he 
had the choice to die and bring about the demise of the Church.  Brecht even goes on to 
use a religious metaphor to drive home his point, writing,  “Galileo’s crime can be 
regarded as the ‘original sin’ of modern natural sciences” (Brecht, “Praise or 
Condemnation of Galileo?” 225; see also Brecht, “Preis oder Verdammung des Galilei?” 
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12).  Galileo’s recantation has, by allowing the Church to recover, condemned mankind 
to eternal exile from a Garden of Eden where common people, peasants, workers could 
have been free. 
 Of course, the above must appear dubious if read as a statement about the real-life 
Catholic Church and the historic Galileo.  In the play, however, Brecht magnifies 
Galileo’s importance.  This is evidenced by Galileo’s own lines from his long speech to 
Andrea in the penultimate scene:  “Ich habe zudem die Überzeugung gewonnen, Sarti, 
daß ich niemals in wirklicher Gefahr schwebte.  Einige Jahre lang war ich ebenso stark 
wie die Obrigkeit” (Brecht, Die Stücke von Bertolt Brecht in einem Band, 537).  In the 
universe of the play, Galileo is the Church’s equal in power.   
Beyond accusing Galileo of sacrificing the common good in order to save his own 
skin, Brecht, in 1947, also holds Galileo directly responsible for the atom bomb:  “The 
atom bomb is, both as a technical and a social phenomenon, the classical end-product of 
[Galileo’s] contribution to science and his failure to contribute to society” (Brecht, 
“Praise or Condemnation of Galileo?” 225; see also Brecht, “Preis oder Verdammung des 
Galilei?” 13).  Galileo’s responsibility, according to Brecht, is direct in the sense that, in 
deciding to live and let the Church live, abandoning the working people to their fate, 
instead of exposing the Church in its lie when he had the chance, thereby freeing the 
people from the power of the Church, Galileo founded a certain tradition of science 
siding with authority against the interests of the common man.  And this is the tradition 
that, in time, grew to the stage where science is even capable of entering the service of 
warlike nations to devise such weapons as the atom bomb.  And then the nations use the 
weapons built by science to kill entire cities of common people, which is what happened 
30 
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki—and which, on account of the cold war, still remained a very 
real threat when Brecht wrote the third, final version of Leben des Galilei.   
In addition to his own writings about science and scientists in Leben des Galilei, 
the record of Brecht’s oral discussions with others also sheds light on the subsequent 
development of the issue in the third version of the play.  Just days after the 1955 
premiere of Leben des Galilei in Köln, Brecht spoke to Ernst Schumacher in München, 
and Schumacher reports:  
Brecht bestätigte [Ernst Schumacher], dass er unter dem Eindruck der  
Weiterentwicklung der A- zur H-Bombe, der Atombombenversuche der USA auf  
dem Eniwetok-Atoll und deren verheerende Auswirkungen auf japanische  
Fischer, schließlich auch durch den Prozess gegen Robert J. Oppenheimer im Jahr  
1953, die Tendenz der amerikanischen Fassung des Galilei noch verstärkt habe.  
Der zeige ihn als genialen Wissenschaftler, der sein geistiges Produkt den  
gesellschaftlichen Machthabern überlässt, die “es zu gebrauchen, um es zu  
missbrauchen.”  (Schumacher, “Wie Brecht beinahe ein Einstein-Stück schrieb”) 
In other words, when the world war ended, nothing improved on the front of science.  
Indeed, things worsened, from the atom bomb to the hydrogen bomb, from developing a 
bomb in the desperate situation when, in the middle of the war, there was reason to fear 
that the other side was developing the bomb too, to testing a bomb in the Pacific Ocean as 
a matter of course during the cold war.  These new developments led Brecht to write into 
the play’s third version yet another thing Galileo could have done, had he not recanted:  
“In die deutsche Neufassung habe er noch den Satz eingefügt, dass - so sinngemäß - 
Galilei auch zum Anstifter eines ›hippokratischen Eides der Naturwissenschaftler‹ hätte 
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werden können, wenn er nicht abgeschworen hätte” (Schumacher, “Wie Brecht beinahe 
ein Einstein-Stück schrieb”)—beyond the opportunity to make himself into the champion 
of the common, working man, Galileo also had—and refused—the opportunity to 
portray, once and for all, science into the champion of good against evil—in Brecht’s 
own immediate context, the opportunity to make science into the champion of peace 
against nuclear warfare. 
 Later critics have carried forward the discussion beyond a Hippocratic Oath for 
scientists to activism for peace:  “[T]his play is to raise questions about the scientists and 
their responsibilities.  If we go back to Galileo himself, then, it is because of 
Oppenheimer and the atomic bomb; and the play thereby insensibly becomes an allegory 
of the anti-nuclear movement” (Jameson, Brecht and Method, 154).  It is not sufficient 
that science should merely not submit to, and serve, the powers of destruction.  Science 
must actively resist those powers, at least to the point where the damage is neutralized—
the damage that has been done directly by science’s own previous collusion with those 
powers.   
One way to discuss Galileo’s recantation is, of course, to compare and contrast 
him with someone who does not recant, and Leben des Galilei also features, albeit off-
stage, such a character: the earlier physicist Giordano Bruno, for whose extradition to 
Rome, and subsequent burning at the stake, Galileo holds Priuli responsible in the first 
scene of the 1955 version.  Priuli’s says the reason why Bruno was extradited was not 
that he had taught the model of Copernicus, but rather that he was not Venetian.  The 
Nazis had been prone to use the label “Jewish science” for the work of Jewish 
scientists—and to distinguish it from “German science,” the work of scientists the regime 
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considered German—and Priuli’s answer to Galileo’s charge may well have been a 
fleeting allusion to the Nazi distinction between “German science” and “Jewish science.”   
Of primary interest here, however, are not Priuli’s motives, but rather the consequences 
of Bruno’s refusal to recant.  The entire debate about the atom bomb and ethics in Leben 
des Galilei is teleological, is about consequences.  If one had the luxury to ignore the 
consequences, then, of course, the splitting of the uranium atom was the pièce de 
résistance of modern physics, the crown jewel of the “new type of physicist” whom 
Brecht had so joyfully toasted in 1941. 
And the consequences of Bruno’s refusal to recant were, to say the least, anti-
climactic to the point of being a cautionary tale:  He was burnt at the stake, and nothing 
else happened.  There was no revolution.  Had he recanted, he could have lived on and, 
like Brecht’s Galileo, continued his research in secret.  Science lost something when 
Bruno decided to die rather than give in, and society did not gain anything either.  In fact, 
society may have lost something as well, because it is entirely possible that other 
scientists—such as Galileo—were intimidated by the spectacle of his death into giving up 
programmes of research that ran the risk of drawing the Church’s disapproval.  One must 
ask, then, how much sense it makes to condemn Galileo for recanting. 
Brecht touched upon the comparison of Galileo with Bruno when he wrote—
during 1938–1939, i.e. precisely when he wrote the first version of Leben des Galilei—a 
short prose piece about Bruno called Der Mantel des Ketzers (Schumacher, Drama und 
Geschichte: Bertolt Brechts ›Leben des Galilei‹ und andere Stücke, 19; text in Brecht, 
Kalendergeschichten, 16–25).  Four decades later, the poet Volker Braun (1939– ) 
addressed the issue in two poems, one called Bruno and another called Prozeß Galilei.  A 
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comparative analysis of Leben des Galilei, Der Mantel des Ketzers, and both of Braun’s 
poems identifies the fallacy in defending Galileo’s actions by pointing out Bruno’s fate:  
“[Brecht und Braun] [b]eide schreiben sie ja dem Pisaner/Florentiner eine zeitweilige 
Machtstellung und daraus erwachsende Einfluß- und Wirkungsmöglichkeiten zu, welche, 
mindestens für die damalige Zeit, kaum beherrschender gedacht werden könnten” 
(Grimm, “Der Nolaner und der Pisaner: Zwei Italiener bei Bertolt Brecht und Volker 
Braun,” 181).  Galileo—the Galileo we see in Leben des Galilei—had become so 
powerful by the time when he faced the Inquisition that what had happened to Bruno 
earlier could not possibly have happened to him.  The Church could not have burnt a man 
of his stature at the stake—this is supported by the scene between Pope Urban VIII and 
the Cardinal Inquisitor:  “Schließlich ist der Mann der größte Physiker dieser Zeit, das 
Licht Italiens, und nicht irgendein Wirrkopf.  Er hat Freunde.  Da ist Versailles.  Da ist 
der Wiener Hof” (Brecht, Die Stücke von Bertolt Brecht in einem Band, 530).    Any 
injury that the Church caused to Galileo could have sparked social unrest—this is 
supported by the conversation between Galileo and the iron-founder Vanni in scene 11 of 
the 1955 version:  “Ich stehe und falle mit Männern wie Sie, Herr Galilei.  Wenn man je 
versuchen sollte, etwas gegen Sie zu Machen, dann erinnern Sie sich bitte, daß Sie 
Freunde in allen Geschtszweigen haben.  Hinter Ihnen stehen die oberitalienischen 
Städte, Herr” (Brecht, Die Stücke von Bertolt Brecht in einem Band, 528).  And Galileo 
was aware of his own position of power, as he confirms in his farewell speech to Andrea:  
“Ich habe zudem die Überzeugung gewonnen, Sarti, daß ich niemals in wirklicher Gefahr 
schwebte.  Einige Jahre lang war ich ebenso stark wie die Obrigkeit” (Brecht, Die Stücke 
von Bertolt Brecht in einem Band, 537).  At the time when the Inquisition brought him 
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from Florence to Rome, Galileo enjoyed international support; more importantly, he had 
the support of the common people; and he even knew his own power.   
In Brecht’s view, the power that Galileo had attained before he recanted stemmed 
from the people.  He had grown powerful because, as evidenced in the ballad scene 
(scene 10 of the 1955 version), the common people had proved receptive to his work.  It 
must, then, count as yet another depth of betrayal that he stopped short of using his 
position of power to relieve the people from the authority of the Church in spite of the 
fact that he had received his power from the people.  Furthermore, there is a redoubling 
of irony in between Bruno’s sacrifice of self that served no purpose and Galileo’s 
betrayal of society from a position where resistance from him might have, finally, given 
society freedom.  Any attempt to redeem Galileo by means of a comparison with Bruno is 
a false parallel. 
However, the question of Galileo’s ethics is still not quite a one-dimensional 
issue.  Galileo’s character has responsibilities in not one, but two directions:   
Das Verhältnis von Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft ist für Galilei definiert durch 
das Problem der “doppelten Verantwortung” des Wissenschaftlers, einmal 
gegenüber der Wissenschaft, insofern sie nach ihrem Selbstverständnis nur dem 
Geist der Wahrheit verpflichtet ist und im übrigen sich selbst genügt, zum 
anderen gegenüber die Gesellschaft, deren Wohlfahrt sie dienen soll. 
(Zimmermann 95) 
In other words, Galileo—in general, any scientist—has both a responsibility to science 
and scientific truth and a responsibility to society and social good.  The discussion in this 
section has, for the most part, condemned Galileo for his apparent abandonment of his 
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responsibility to society.  It can, however, also be argued that, for a human, for a being 
made of flesh and blood, it is not possible to truly fulfill either of the two 
responsibilities—that Galileo, being no super-human hero, but only human, was, from the 
very beginning, doomed to fail on both counts: 
 Das Versagen Galileis gegenüber dem Anspruch der “doppelten Verantwortung”  
ist letzlich zurückzuführen auf den Gegegnsatz zwischen der Idee einer an soziale  
Verantwortung gebundenen Wissenschaft und einer Wirklichkeit, die dadurch  
gekennzeichnet ist, daß auf der einen Seite die Freiheit von Lehre und Forschung  
der staatlichen Zensur unterworfen ist und auf der anderen Seite auch ein großer  
Gelehrter und Forscher aus menschlicher Schwäche unter den Bedingungen eines  
unmenschlichen Regimes weder der sozialen noch der wissenschaftlichen  
Verantwortung gerecht zu werden vermag.  (Zimmermann 97) 
In terms of the three stages of crisis outlined in the introduction to this thesis, Galileo is 
already doomed when, in the first two scenes, he—already a world-famous scientist—
must first haggle with Priuli for his salary, must then pass off the telescope as his own 
invention in order to get the raise he needs.  He is doomed a second time when, in the 
third scene, he must write his grovelling letter to Florence.  And only then—da aller 
guten Dinge drei sind—he is doomed a third time when, off-stage in scene 12 of the 1955 
version, he must recant when the Inquisition shows him the instruments of torture.   
Werner Zimmermann’s point above—that the play’s structures of power and 
authority left Galileo necessarily incapable of fulfilling either of his twin responsibilities, 
one to science and the other to society—illustrates Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of 
needs, a theory that was, incidentally, first published in 1943, i.e. was also developed 
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around the time when Brecht wrote Leben des Galilei.  According to Maslow, “the basic 
human needs are organized into a hierarchy of relative prepotency” (“A Theory of 
Human Motivation,” 375; Motivation and Personality, 17)—human needs form a 
pyramid, and a human being cannot rise to address the needs situated higher on the 
pyramid unless his or her needs at the pyramid’s lower levels are satisfied first.  Esteem, 
which Galileo appears to lose by recanting, is the second highest level of the pyramid 
(Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” 381–382; Motivation an Personality, 21–
22).  Physiological needs, which are what he struggles to meet in the first three scenes, 
are the pyramid’s lowest level (Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” 372–376; 
Motivation and Personality, 15–17), and safety, which is what is at stake in the 
Inquisition, is the second lowest level (Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” 376–
380; Motivation and Personality, 18–20).  According to Maslow’s theory, a human being 
is not capable of being mindful of his or her need of being esteemed when either his or 
her physiological needs are not satisfied—“Erst kommt das Fressen, dann kommt die 
Moral” (Brecht, Die Stücke von Bertolt Brecht in einem Band, 191)—or his or her safety 
is threatened.  In other words, the reason why Galileo must recant is that he is human.  
And the fact that Galileo is human, not a hero, is precisely Brecht’s point in the famous 
“Unglücklich das Land, das Helden nötig hat” (in scene 13 in the 1955 version).  Galileo 
is human—that is his tragedy, and that alone should be his epitaph. 
 
EXTRA-SCIENTIFIC THEMES IN LEBEN DES GALILEI 
 The critical consensus certainly seems to be that the major theme of Leben des 
Galilei is science and its ethics, as seen in the previous section.  However, Brecht’s play 
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also has several additional themes that contribute to its complexity.  This section probes a 
selection of critical literature on an assortment of extra-scientific themes in Leben des 
Galilei.  Once again, the discussion opens with two pieces of commentary from Brecht 
himself—one on the Church as it appears in the play, another on the sensual dimension of 
Galileo’s character—and then continues with contributions from other critics.  
 One of the play’s auxiliary themes is, obviously, the Church, which the preceding 
section has already, and in loud colours, painted as the ultimate, victorious antagonist in 
Leben des Galilei.  It is well-known that Brecht had a negative view of religion.  For 
example, at the end of June 1938—just months before starting the first version of the 
play—“Brecht spricht von seinem eingewurzelten, von der Großmutter her ererbten Haß 
gegen die Pfaffen” (Benjamin 165).  Brecht himself, however, pleaded against staging 
Leben des Galilei as a play against the Church:  “Es ist für die Theater wichtig, zu 
wissen, daß dieses Stück einen großen Teil seiner Wirkung verlieren muß, wenn seine 
Aufführung hauptsächlich gegen die katholische Kirche gerichtet ist” (Brecht, 
“Darstellung der Kirche,” 14, italicization Brecht’s; see also Brecht, “Portrayal of the 
Church,” 216).  Leben des Galilei is a work of literature, and literature, quite generally, 
derives its power and its interest, from its insistence upon figurative language.  To read 
any element of a literary text only literally—instead of also figuratively—effectively 
annihilates the text by limiting its meaning and denies its plurity of meaning.  
Accordingly, where Brecht writes “Church,” he is specifically inviting the reader to read 
the Church also as a symbol.  There is nothing in the play itself that explicitly rules out 
letting “Church” be the actual Church.  However, the reader cannot take that literal 
reading to be the final reading—just as the character of Galileo is really intended to be 
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read as the “new type of physicist,” even though there is nothing in the play itself that 
explicitly rules out letting Galileo be the actual Galileo of history, the Renaissance 
physicist Galileo.  The text, simply because it has been labelled a literary text by its 
author, demands that the reader must understand it figuratively (Empson x, 234, where 
the technique is called “ambiguity”; Todorov, The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a 
Literary Genre, 62; Todorov, The Poetics of Prose, 240, 250). 
 The reader must ask, then, what the Church in Leben des Galilei should be a 
symbol of, and Brecht suggests:  “In dem vorliegenden Stück fungiert die Kirche, auch 
wo sie der freien Forschung entgegentritt, einfach als Obrigkeit” (Brecht, “Darstellung 
der Kirche,” 14; see also Brecht, “Portrayal of the Church,” 216).  The antagonist of 
Leben des Galilei is not solely religion, but rather authority. Brecht gives his abstract 
antagonist the concrete form of a three-headed monster, so to speak, corresponding to the 
three stages of crisis outlined in the introduction to this thesis.  The first head is the 
Republic of Venice and the second head is the House of Medici; the Church in Leben des 
Galilei is not literally the Church, but rather the third, final head of the monster of 
authority.  Brecht goes on to add:  “Die weltlichen Interesse hoher Würdenträger satirisch 
aufs Korn zu nehmen, scheint mir billig” (Brecht, “Darstellung der Kirche,” 14; see also 
Brecht, “Portrayal of the Church,” 217).  No matter how much “Haß gegen die Pfaffen” 
(Benjamin 165) Brecht may have inherited from his grandmother, he is too great an artist 
to take cheap shots at anyone or anything from the stage of his art. 
The role of the Church in the play mirrors in an interesting way in Galileo’s 
decision to change the language of his writings:  “Galilei, like Luther, decides to appeal 
to the broadest possible base by writing in the vernacular” (Simpson 174).  Even though 
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the Church in Leben des Galilei is not only the Church, but can also be read as a symbol 
of authority, the progress of the play parallels to a certain point in the plot the history of 
the Church.  Galileo, like Martin Luther before him, starts writing in the vernacular after 
scene nine of the final version, and, in the following scene, his work, like Luther’s 
translation of the Bible, reaches the common people.  In this way, Galileo has another 
possible symbolic reading—beyond representing the “new type of physicist,” he can also 
stand for the democratization of knowledge.  In the universe of Leben des Galilei, 
knowledge was confined to the aristocracy until Galileo set it free by writing in the 
language of Federzoni, and this is precisely what the real-life Luther had done with the 
Bible one hundred years before the period in which Leben des Galilei is set.  
The parallel between Brecht’s Galileo and Martin Luther exists because it traces 
the natural course of events, both in the case of Luther and in Brecht’s play.  In other 
words, this is a parallel that had to be there in the text, whether Brecht wrote it with 
intention or not.  The parallel between Galileo and Martin Luther breaks down, of course, 
when Cosmo de Medici hands over Galileo to the Inquisition.  The reason why the 
parallel can break down at that point is that the House of Medici, being itself one of the 
three heads of the monster of authority in Leben des Galilei, can, at pleasure, deny the 
events their natural course.  Indeed, the reason why it is possible, even easy, to show 
authority as an antagonist is that authority has the power to, and often does, act anti-
naturally, thus becoming the natural antagonist.   
 Besides his attitude toward the Church, Brecht also continually addressed the 
theme of sensual pleasures as a driving force in the character of his Galileo:  “Galilei ist 
natürlich kein Falstaff: als überzeugter Materialist besteht er auf physischen Freuden” 
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(Brecht, “Das sinnliche in Galilei;” see also Brecht, “The Sensual Element in Galileo,” 
218).  The play repeatedly emphasizes that Galileo is human, not a hero, and one way the 
play emphasizes Galileo’s humanity is by pointing out the protagonist’s partiality to good 
food.  The “physische Freuden” Brecht means are, however, not limited to things like 
good food and good wine, but are to be understood in an extended sense:  “[W]ichtig ist, 
daß er auf sinnlicher Weise arbeitet” (Brecht, “Das sinnliche in Galilei,” italicization 
Brecht’s; see also Brecht, “The Sensual Element in Galileo,” 218)—the good food can, 
once again, be read as a symbol, specifically, as a symbol of Galileo’s scientific work.  
Sensuality is both a marker of Galileo’s humanity, i.e. lack of super-humanity, and one of 
his defining characteristics. 
 Then again, science is not the only thing symbolized by the good food of which 
Galileo is fond:  “[D]ann gibt es in seinem Reden Stellen, wo er gute Wörter auswählt 
und sie abschmeckt wie Gewürze” (Brecht, “Das sinnliche in Galilei;” see also Brecht, 
“The Sensual Element in Galileo,” 219).  Sensual pleasure—especially the pleasure of the 
gustatory sense—is very much a defining feature of Galileo’s character.  More explicitly, 
anything can, potentially, be a source of sensual pleasure to him—and, therefore, sensual 
pleasure means everything to him.  This means Galileo can almost be read as a 
personification, a concrete manifestation of sensual pleasure. 
A later critical reading develops this theme of sensual pleasure in Leben des 
Galilei even further by means of a “fusion” of the acts of seeing and eating (Suvin 190).  
Brecht himself equates scientific research with sex in elsewhere:  “Der Forschungstrieb 
[ist] kaum weniger lustvoll oder diktatorisch wie der Zeugungstrieb” (Brecht, “Preis oder 
Verdammung des Galilei?” 13, see also Brecht, “Praise or Condemnation of Galileo?” 
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225).  The particular equation Suvin suggests is, however, of a different nature, because 
the two actions that Suvin is condensing together are both already directly represented in 
the text.  The equation of seeing and eating can only mean that the two actions must be 
read as being interchangeable—seeing and eating can, throughout the text, each be read 
as a symbol of the other.   
The “seeing” that takes place in Leben des Galilei is, of course, the seeing of the 
heavens—or, rather, the seeing through of the heavens—that happens through the 
telescope.  Galileo, being the master of the telescope, is the pioneer of seeing, is one who 
sees more, sees better, and, more importantly, sees “right” (Suvin 190–191), which 
should, then, justify his prodigious appetite for good food as well.  Furthermore, “[i]t 
should be noted that this alimentary parallel to gaping—the Brechtian fressen famous 
from The Threepenny Opera but as important in some other plays—is here judged 
positively, the reverse of glotzen” (Suvin 196, see also Torby 96), and the positive 
evaluation of consumption can serve to completely invert the meaning of the insults that 
Andrea hurls at Galileo in the antepenultimate scene, turning Weinschlauch and 
Schneckenfresser from condemnation into praise.  In this way, the equation of seeing and 
eating in Leben des Galilei turns damnation into praise—a thing into its opposite. 
 Beyond the theme of role of the Church and the theme of Galileo’s indulgence in 
sensual pleasure, another subplot that haunts the play is the historical theme of exile—in 
fact, it has been called a “hidden theme” (Stern 110), yet even this hidden theme has 
several faces:  “Four aspects of the exile experience appear in the drama: the refugees’ 
flight from Germany, their economic straits, loss of identity, and intellectual suppression” 
(Stern 111).  A quick demonstration of the four aspects Stern enumerates is in order.  
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First, in scene 11 of the 1955 version, Galileo first contemplates going away to Sargedo 
in Padua, then receives an offer from Vanni of a carriage and horses to escape to Venice, 
and finally, after being snubbed by Cosmo de Medici, is about to escape from Florence at 
once—all of these images from Renaissance Italy can be images of refugees trying to 
leave Nazi Germany (Stern 111–112).  Loss of identity appears in the same scene, first 
when Gaffone fails to acknowledge Galileo, and again when Cosmo de Medici snubs 
Galileo.  The economic plight of refugees is prominent when Priuli’s suggests, in the 
opening scene of the 1955 version, that Galileo might accept the low salary in Venice in 
exchange protection from the Inquisition (Stern 112–113).  And the intellectual 
suppression is, of course, seen first in Galileo’s eight years of silence before Cardinal 
Barberini becomes the new pope, then, conclusively, in Galileo’s house arrest in the 
penultimate scene of the 1955 version.  Stern’s four aspects combine to make sure that 
Galileo remains an eternal outsider through the play’s fifteen scenes.  Curiously, many of 
the brief allusions to flight and exile were cut in the second (American) version, which 
Brecht prepared in collaboration with Charles Laughton, who had no personal experience 
of either flight or political exile.  Laughton’s point was that the allusions did not always 
help advance the narrative.  This, by the way, might be a reason why exile remains a 
minor theme:  Because the allusions to exile are not indispensable to the plot, the mind of 
a reader who fails to register those allusions does not skip a beat.  The allusions to flight 
and exile were all subsequently restored in the final version (Stern 115–116).  The fact 
that Brecht restored the allusions in 1955 suggests that he must have been conscious of 
the hidden theme of flight and exile, restoring them, on purpose, for the sake of the effect 
they had—the effect of adding an extra layer of human experience to the play.  The 
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themes of flight and exile do not move the plot forward, but they serve to keep Galileo 
from becoming a super-human hero.  The themes also serve to keep Galileo an outsider 
throughout the play, which contributes Galileo’s lack of identification with the interests 
of any authority throughout the play.  Galileo must remain independent, yet he must not 
become a hero, but rather remain independent while being only human.  This is only 
possible because he is an outsider—outsiders, even human ones, are always independent 
because they never belong—and Galileo remains outsider because of the hidden themes 
of flight and exile.  
 A more prominent theme than flight and exile is the theme of Marxism in Leben 
des Galilei.  Several features of the play quite plainly make Marxist statements, such as 
the great amount of care Brecht takes to “pit the dominant ideology of the Church, which 
controls the means of production of the peasants of Campagna—and therefore controls 
theological scientific truth—against the potentially revolutionary scientific truth 
discovered, but not controlled by Galileo” (Caldwell 40).  It is, of course, Brecht’s own 
point again that the Church is a symbol of authority and the play is the account of a 
revolution suppressed by the authority.  But Caldwell places the focus upon the Church-
authority’s control over the means of production, and upon class struggle, specifically 
represented by the struggle of the peasants of Campagna against the Church.  Again, the 
refusal of the Florentine scholars to even look through the telescope in the fourth scene 
can be interpreted as the resistance of the privileged class to anything that might 
jeopardize its privilege in the social order (Squiers, “Visibility, Divisibility and the 
Language of Revolution: a Brechtian Perspective,” 40), which is a frequently recurring 
point in Brecht (Squiers, “A Short Organum on Ideology: Brecht on the Bourgeois 
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Weltanschauung,” 45).  Indeed, the whole play is a series of illustrations of various 
aspects of mid-twentieth-century Marxist theory (Borchardt 155–159).  The play’s 
relationship to Marxism is, however, problematic, because Leben des Galilei also runs 
counter to Marxist thought in at least one way:  “Es entspricht nicht der marxistischen 
Lehre, daß Brecht in seinem Galilei einem einzelnen, einem ›Helden‹, eine so 
entscheidende Rolle für den Gang der Geschichte zuerkennt” (Rohrmoser, “Brecht ∙ Das 
Leben des Galilei,” 412, see also Rohrmoser, “Brecht’s Galileo,” 124)—the very idea of 
a powerful protagonist is a step in the direction of a cult of personality, and, therefore, 
runs contrary to Marxist teachings.  Thus Leben des Galilei foregrounds both Marxist 
teachings and the counter-Marxist feature of a powerful protagonist.  This type of 
complication—contradictory themes in the same text—is not unique to Leben des Galilei 
as a dramatic technique in Brecht:  In Aufstieg und Fall der Stadt Mahagonny (1930; 
Brecht, Die Stücke von Bertolt Brecht in einem Band, 203–226), for example, he writes 
both bourgeois and anarchist features into his absurdist text, then proceeding to satirize 
both of them (Melchinger, “Mahagonny als Mysterienspiel,” 32–33).  Such incorporation 
of contradictory themes in the same play serves to build a dialectic within the play. 
Along with the dialogue between Marxist teachings and the counter-Marxist 
concept of a powerful protagonist, Brecht leaves open the possibility of an anti-Stalinist 
reading of Leben des Galilei:   
[I]f Oppenheimer’s acquiescence in the making of the bomb comes to be  
suggested by Galileo’s renunciation and submission to the power of the Church,  
surely a number of other topical analogies can also be found: the most obvious  
(yet the least mentioned, no doubt for all kinds of reasons, although Brecht  
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himself mentions it) is the submission of Bukharin in Stalin’s show trials.   
(Jameson, Brecht and Method, 154) 
Another article reports about the American version that, “Als [Galileo] in New York 
aufgeführt wurde, war man in Versuchung sich einzureden, daß Brecht Anti-Stalinist 
geworden sei” (Arendt, “Der Dichter Bertolt Brecht,” 56; see also Arendt, “The Poet 
Bertolt Brecht,” 45).  And Leben des Galilei has also been read as an account of Nazism 
in Germany in the following way:  
 Wie gefährlich die präzise Allgemeinheit der Dichtkunst ist, läßt sich am besten  
an einem seiner neuesten Theaterstücke, dem Galilei nachweisen, in dem der  
Forscher beschrieben wird, der etwas entdeckt hat (die Erde dreht sich um die  
Sonne), was den Lehren eines autoritären Herrschaftsapparates zuwiderläuft (der  
katholischen Kirche und der Inquisition).  Es ist keine Frage, daß dieses Drama  
mit gleicher Genauigkeit auf die Nazi-Diktatur wie auf die bolschewistische  
Diktatur paßt.  (Arendt, “Der Dichter Bertolt Brecht,” 56; see also Arendt, “The  
Poet Bertolt Brecht,” 45) 
This, of course, is the auxiliary theme, discussed by Brecht himself, that the Church in 
Leben des Galilei can be a symbol of any figure or institution of authority.  Brecht keeps 
the symbol sufficiently ambiguous for the play to function either as a condemnation of 
Hitler or as a condemnation of Stalin.  
 The anti-authoritarianism, as well as the wide assortment of other auxiliary 
themes—such as the theme of flight and exile, or the equation of seeing, eating, and 
knowledge—serve the purpose of making Leben des Galilei a complex, multi-
dimensional text.  Without the interplay of the minor themes, it may have run the risk of 
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devolving into a naïve, if still powerful, text of protest against nuclear arms.  As it stands, 
it is a tableau of a deeply divided, lethally conflicted world.  Its function is to offer the 
reader the momentary luxury of viewing that world from the outside, as though 
witnessing a catastrophe from the exile, along the axis of time, of 300 years from the 
scene of the catastrophe.  And Brecht’s play, Leben des Galilei, becomes the telescope 
through which the reader can see—and know—from so great a removal. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE INTERTEXTUALITY OF LEBEN DES GALILEI 
 This chapter analyzes Leben des Galilei in immediate relation to three different 
groups of other texts.  Opposing Leben des Galilei to other texts sheds light on the ways 
in which it differs from those plays, throwing into relief things it is not, thus 
simultaneously highlighting things it is.  The first section studies Leben des Galilei in 
opposition to two plays, one by Friedrich Dürrenmatt (1921–1990), the other by Max 
Frisch (1911–1991).  Brecht directly influenced both authors, who may be fairly called 
his immediate successors as the most significant German-language playwrights (see, for 
example, Frisch, Biedermann und die Brandstifter, v).  The second section proceeds to 
set Leben des Galilei against other plays of Brecht himself, focusing on one particular 
way in which Brecht went completely against his own standard procedure when he wrote 
Leben des Galilei.  The final section of this chapter constructs a convergence of the 
apparently unrelated first and the second sections, suggesting a common structure 
underlying the observations of those two sections. 
 
BRECHT, FRIEDRICH DÜRRENMATT, MAX FRISCH 
 Friedrich Dürrenmatt’s Die Physiker was written during 1959–1961 and first 
produced in 1962 at the Schauspielhaus in Zürich—where the first version of Leben des 
Galilei had also premiered almost two decades earlier.  Die Physiker was also first 
published in 1962 (Dürrenmatt 94).  The play is labelled, already in its title, a comedy. 
Once, when asked about Die Physiker’s relationship to Leben des Galilei, Dürrenmatt 
replied that he had wanted to write not a tragedy, but rather the satire that is staged before 
the tragedy (Zimmermann 124).  Dürrenmatt’s reply may have been itself intended 
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satirically, because Brecht had insisted that Leben des Galilei was not a tragedy (Brecht, 
“Leben des Galilei ist keine Trägodie;” Brecht, “The Life of Galileo Is Not a Tragedy”), 
and because, elsewhere, Dürrenmatt also wrote that, in his play, the story had been “zu 
Ende gedacht” (Dürrenmatt 91), which suggests that he intended Die Physiker to be more 
of a last word than an opening act.  In either case, it is certain that Die Physiker was a 
conscious response to Leben des Galilei. 
As a first step toward an independent determination of the relationship between 
the two plays, here is a brief summary of Die Physiker:  The physicist Möbius makes a 
discovery that can, potentially, cause a catastrophe.  He pretends to be insane and lands in 
an asylum, hoping to keep his discovery from receiving attention and being put to use in 
a destructive way.  Two spies, of different nations, also pretending to be insane—one 
pretending to think he is Isaac Newton, the other pretending to believe himself to be 
Albert Einstein—follow Die Physiker’s protagonist Möbius to the same asylum, each 
hoping to get their hands on the new discovery, maybe even to convince Möbius to work 
further for his nation.  However, it is Möbius who convinces both Newton and Einstein to 
abandon their missions and stay on at the asylum, where they could all continue to 
pretend insanity while making progress in science without running the risk that their 
discoveries might harm humanity some day.  In a twist ending, the psychiatrist in charge 
of the asylum, Dr. Mathilde von Zahnd, turns out to be the character who is genuinely 
insane.  She has already acquired the new discovery, and has plans for dominating the 
world by using it.   
The similarities between Die Physiker and Leben des Galilei on the level of the 
ethics of nuclear physics are obvious.  Brecht’s Galileo, proposes, in the penultimate 
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scene of the 1955 version of Leben des Galilei, a Hippocratic Oath for scientists, that 
scientists should take it upon themselves to ensure that their work only helps, and never 
hurts, humanity; Dürrenmatt assumes that scientific research is carried out in secret, but 
stops short of actively serving destructive forces—assumes that J. Robert Oppenheimer 
and the physicists of the Manhattan Project do not build the bomb, that science has, and 
follows, the Hippocratic Oath Brecht’s Galileo had suggested.  Then Dürrenmatt asks 
what would happen if, starting from the assumption, the story is “zu Ende gedacht”.  
The differences between the two plays are obvious as well.  The ultimate point of 
the last version of Leben des Galilei is its hope that the envisioned Hippocratic Oath for 
scientists might actually result in a science that would only do good.  Dürrenmatt’s 
answer to his own question is that, in spite of the best efforts of the three physicists, there 
would always be a catastrophe.  The ultimate point of Die Physiker is that—in the words 
of Möbius—“Was einmal gedacht wurde, kann nicht mehr zurückgenommen werden” 
(Dürrenmatt 85).  Science is not capable of taking back its discoveries when it senses that 
they are about to be used for destructive purposes.  Once a scientist makes a discovery, he 
or she no longer has any control of how the discovery is used. 
Thus Leben des Galilei and Die Physiker are both sharply critical of scientific 
ethics—or the lack thereof—but the similarities end there.  Die Physiker believes that the 
situation is beyond all hope of redemption, that it is impossible to have science without 
also having disastrous consequences of science.  Leben des Galilei, in proposing the 
Hippocratic Oath for scientists (Brecht, Die Stücke von Bertolt Brecht in einem Band, 
537), believes that, while fundamental changes in scientific ethics are called for, a purely 
benevolent science should, ultimately, be possible.  While Leben des Galilei does not 
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explicitly show such a purely benevolent science on the stage, there is nothing in the text 
that explicitly rules out such a science either.  The possibility remains open:  Andrea, for 
example, could be crossing the border carrying, in his mind, the ideal of a science that 
would only do good; indeed, Galileo’s manuscript could, conceivably, be read as a 
symbol of its author’s express ideal of a benevolent science, a covenant, and Andrea’s 
collusion in smuggling the manuscript out of Italy could, then, be read as a symbol of his 
accepting Galileo’s ideal.  Leben des Galilei leaves optimism standing when its curtain 
falls.   
The difference between Leben des Galilei and Die Physiker is, then, one about 
optimism and pessimism.  Friedrich Dürrenmatt’s play is critical of science, and 
explicitly states that there is no hope, no possibility of grace left; Brecht’s play leaves 
open the hope of grace (see, for example, de la Viña 40; see also Haus, “What Can a 
Galileo Production Reveal?” 131–132), while still emphasizing the massive extent of 
change that must come about before grace can be attained. 
In contrast to Die Physiker, Biedermann und die Brandstifter by Max Frisch 
(1911–1991) is, in the main arc of its story, not about the atom bomb at all.  The text 
started, in the first half of 1948, as a brief prose piece called “Burleske” (printed in 
Frisch, Tagebuch 1946–1949, 243–249).  A version called Herr Biedermann und die 
Brandstifter was broadcast as a radio play in March 1953 (Frisch, Biedermann und die 
Brandstifter, viii); like Galilei and Die Physiker, Biedermann und die Brandstifter too 
was first produced at the Schauspielhaus in Zürich, premiering on March 29, 1958 
(Frisch, Biedermann und die Brandstifter, viii).  It was first published as a book the 
following year (Frisch, Biedermann und die Brandstifter, ix). 
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Frisch’s play opens with the title character, Biedermann, reading in the newspaper 
about an unusually large number of incidents of arson.  A stranger named Schmitz 
appears at his door, and Biedermann lets him stay in the attic.  Later, another stranger, 
Eisenring, comes to the house and joins Schmitz in Biedrmann’s attic.  Soon the attic is 
full of barrels of petrol.  A policeman stops by to inform Biedermann that his former 
employee, Knechtling, has committed suicide.  The policeman asks what is in the barrels, 
and Biedermann lies, saying that the barrels contain hair tonic.  Biedermann does not 
believe that his house guests could be arsonists—in fact, he even measures out the 
detonating fuse together with them, thinking it is all just a joke.  Schmitz and Eisenring 
have a third companion, identified only as “ein Dr. Phil.,” who matches the stereotype of 
an academic.  Biedermann prepares a lavish dinner for his guests.  As a sign of his trust in 
Schmitz and Eisenring—of his belief that they are not arsonists—Biedermann gives them 
matches.  The pair excuse themselves; the Dr. Phil. makes a speech in which he distances 
himself from the actions of Schmitz and Eisenring.  Then the house explodes, and the 
resulting fire is so great that the whole town burns down.  In the coda, Biedermann has 
landed in hell after his death, where he learns that Schmitz is Beelzebub and Eisenring is 
the Devil. 
Brecht’s relationship to Max Frisch is well-documented.  The two playwrights 
were in contact since the beginning of 1948 (Frisch, Tagebuch 1946–1949, 285), when 
Brecht, feeling pressed to repatriate to Europe, settled briefly in Switzerland.  Frisch read, 
and was asked his opinion of, an early manuscript of Brecht’s theoretical text “Kleines 
Organon für das Theater” (Frisch, Tagebuch 1946–1949, 292), in which Brecht discusses 
his seminal theories of theatre, such as epic theatre, Gestus, and Verfremdungseffekt (see 
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Brecht, Brecht on Theatre, 179–205).  The two men even visited the construction site of 
Frisch’s architectural work, the prizewinning public swimming pool in Letzigraben, early 
in 1949 (Frisch, Tagebuch 1946–1949, 338).  Frisch published an excerpt from his diary 
entries about Brecht in Die Zeit the following year (as Frisch, “Brecht der Priester”).  
Another excerpt, translated into English by Carl R. Mueller, appeared as a eulogy after 
Brecht’s death (as Frisch, “Recollections of Brecht”).  In the full title of Biedermann und 
die Brandstifter, Frisch labels his play Ein Lehrstück ohne Lehre—it is a reasonable 
hypothesis that the term Lehrstück is an allusion to Brecht’s 1920s insistence upon the 
didactic functions of his own theatre.  The qualifier ohne Lehre, then, must be an 
announcement of differences between Brecht’s Lehrstücke and Biedermann und die 
Brandstifter.   
The immediate impetus for Biedermann und die Brandstifter may have been the 
communist takeover of Czechoslovakia (Frisch, Tagebuch 1946–1949, 242–243; see also 
Frisch, Biedermann und die Brandstifter, viii).  However, Frisch kept his text sufficiently 
ambiguous that it may be read as a representation of other histories as well, such as the 
rise of Nazism in Germany almost two decades earlier.  In the main reading, Biedermann 
stands for the common man, who, even if well-meaning, is so gullible that he would not 
suspect anything even when his “house guests” tell him to his face that they are going to 
set fire to his house.  The Dr. Phil. is the intellectual who is, for ideological reasons, with 
the arsonists at first, and, for ideological reasons again, declines to take any share of the 
responsibility for the arson and its consequences at the end.  In this main reading, 
Biedermann und die Brandstifter has, content-wise, no clear relationship to Leben des 
Galilei. 
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But the ambiguous nature of Biedermann und die Brandstifter allows for variant, 
secondary readings, such as for reading the Dr. Phil. as a physicist who first works with 
Schmitz and Eisenring because he hopes that the work will benefit the world—Eisenring 
calls the Dr. Phil. “Weltverbesserer,” and adds, “[E]uresgleichen ist immer so 
ideologisch, immer so Ernst, bis es reicht zum Verrat” (Frisch, Biedermann und die 
Brandstifter, 92).  If the Dr. Phil. is a physicist, then, of course, he can be compared with 
Galileo, and also with Dürrenmatt’s Möbius, and even with real-life nuclear physicists, 
such as Oppenheimer.   
At the end of Biedermann und die Brandstifter, with the explosion imminent, the 
Dr. Phil. says as much in his own defence, adding that he had not known the motives of 
Schmitz and Eisenring:  “Sehen Sie, Herr Biedermann, ich was ein Weltverbesserer, ein 
ernster und ehrlicher, ich habe alles gewußt, was sie auf dem Dachboden machten, alles, 
nur das eine nicht:  Die Machen es aus purer Lust!” (Frisch, Biedermann und die 
Brandstifter, 133).  Thus Max Frisch’s Dr. Phil. absolves himself from any obligation to 
answer for the consequences by simply saying, at the last moment, “Ich distanziere 
mich—” (Frisch, Biedermann und die Brandstifter, 132).  The reading of the Dr. Phil. as 
representing modern physics is supported by the fact that the play ends with a series of 
explosions:  “Es folgt eine Serie von Detonationen fürchterlicher Art” (Frisch, 
Biedermann und die Brandstifter, 134). 
The difference between Leben des Galilei and Biedermann und die Brandstifter 
is, again, a matter of unadulterated pessimism in Frisch, where Brecht left open the 
possibility of hope for the future (de la Viña 40; Haus, “What Can a Galileo Production 
Reveal?” 131–132).  Indeed, Frisch is, if possible, even darker than Dürrenmatt, since 
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Schmitz and Eisenring in Frisch’s Biedermann und die Brandstifter act “aus purer Lust,” 
where Frau von Zahnd in Dürrenmatt’s Die Physiker was insane.  And the bleak, cynical 
vision is characteristic of Frisch’s writing in general:  “One idea that recurs throughout 
Frisch’s work is that man will not profit by experience.  There is therefore a note of 
despair in his work which is not dispelled by his sharp ironic wit and his use of the 
grotesque and burlesque” (Frisch, Biedermann und die Brandstifter, v).  Brecht, in 
contrast, refused to leave the world of Leben des Galilei completely devoid of hope—
while showing on his stage, too, the world’s desperate state, he also makes sure to give 
his world a measure of Marxist optimism, saying that things could be better, and even 
saying what must change in order for things to become better. 
The difference—Brecht’s relative optimism against other contemporary 
playwrights’ pure pessimism—was not restricted to German-language theatre.  A 
discussion among several writers and critics that set Brecht—not just Leben des Galilei, 
but his work in general—against the absurdist plays La Leçon (1951) and Les Chaises 
(1952) by Eugène Ionesco (1909–1994) made, among other observations, the same 
remark:  “[D]ie einen gäben die Partie grundsätzlich verloren, die anderen hielten – ohne 
die Schwierigkeit der Situation zu verkennen – an der Hoffnung fest (Tynan et al 27, see 
also Ionesco 87–108).  The absurdists gave up the game as fundamentally lost, but 
Brecht’s epic theatre held on to hope.  Beyond the playwrights, the theatre-going public 
of the mid-to-late 1950s, in the U.S.A. at least, also seems to have favoured the pure 
pessimism of absurdist theatre (Weisstein 374). 
And it was not just among playwrights and theatre-lovers that Brecht’s 
optimism—however reserved, however carefully qualified—was unique.  The Russell-
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Einstein Manifesto, dated July 9, 1955, was written by Bertrand Russell and signed by 
Russell himself, by Albert Einstein, and by nine other eminent intellectuals.  It culminates 
in the following resolution:   
In view of the fact that in any future world war nuclear weapons will certainly be  
employed, and that such weapons threaten the continued existence of mankind,  
we urge the governments of the world to realize, and to acknowledge publicly,  
that their purpose cannot be furthered by a world war, and we urge them,  
consequently, to find peaceful means for the settlement of all matters of dispute  
between them.  (Born et al) 
That is, the illustrious signatories of the manifesto, all of them luminaries of science and 
philosophy, could come up with no good response to the threat of nuclear warfare, and 
was reduced to begging the world powers that they should, in future, refrain from war.  
The problem of the mushroom cloud lurking at the horizon was also considered, the same 
month, at the annual conference of Nobel Laureates at Lindau, and there too a desperate 
plea for peace appeared to be the only solution:  “Alle Nationen müssen zu der 
Entscheidung kommen, freiwillig auf die Gewalt als letztes Mittel der Politik zu 
verzichten. Sind sie dazu nicht bereit, so werden sie aufhören, zu existieren” (Alder et al).  
The world’s greatest scientists and intellectuals addressed the problem of the atom bomb 
in 1955, and they reached the same  conclusion as Möbius in Dürrenmatt’s Die Physiker, 
that “Was einmal gedacht wurde, kann nicht mehr zurückgenommen werden.”  Having 
built the bomb, they were incapable of taking it back.  They were in the power of the 
political authorities that were in possession of the bomb, and the world’s survival 
depended upon the unreliable goodwill of those political authorities in times of war. 
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The question, then, is this:  How could Brecht—in spite of the reality of the bomb, 
when neither science, nor art could see a way out—still continue to write a measure of 
hope into Leben des Galilei?  By what means, what technique did he work his miracle of 
optimism?   
 
THE CLASSICAL MISE EN ABYME 
   The analysis in this section—of Leben des Galilei in a very specific comparison 
with Brecht’s other work—must appear, for the moment, to be completely unrelated with 
all preceding discussion in this thesis.  The next section, however, constructs a 
convergence of the present section with the previous one about the difference along the 
optimism-pessimism axis between Leben des Galilei and other texts contemporary with 
it. 
 In Leben des Galilei, Brecht explicitly alludes to Horace’s Satire 1.8 in scenes 8 
and 12 of the 1955 version, and mentions Horace by name a third time in the penultimate 
scene.  The satire is quoted in the appendix to this thesis; the 1760 English prose 
translation of Christopher Smart (1722–1771) is as follows: 
 Formerly I was the trunk of a wild fig-tree, an useless log: when the artificer, in  
doubt whether he should make a stool or a Priapus of me, determined at last that I  
should be a God.  Henceforward I became a God, the greatest terror of thieves and  
birds: for my right hand restrains thieves, and a bloody-looking pole is stretched  
out from my frightful middle; but a reed fixed upon the crown of my head terrifies  
the mischievous birds, and hinders them from settling in these new gardens.   
Before this, the fellow-slave bore dead corpses thrown out of their narrow cells to  
57 
this place, in order to be deposited in paltry coffins.  This place stood a common  
sepulchre for the miserable mob, for the buffoon Pantolabus, and for Nomentanus  
the rake.  Here a column assigned a thousand feet of ground in front, and three  
hundred towards the fields; that the burial-place should not descend to the heirs of  
the estate.  Now one may live in the Esquiliæ, since it is made an healthy place,  
and walk upon an open terrass; where lately the melancholy passengers beheld  
the ground frightful with white bones: tho’ both the thieves and wild beasts used  
to infest this place, put together, do not occasion me so much care and trouble, as  
do these hags, that turn people’s minds by their incantations and drugs.  These I  
cannot by any means destroy nor hinder, but that they will gather bones and  
noxious herbs, as soon as the fleeting moon has shewn forth her beauteous face. 
 I myself saw Canidia, with her sable garment tucked up, walk with bare  
feet and disheveled hair, yelling together with the elder Sagana.  Paleness had  
render’d each of them horrible to behold.  They began to claw up the earth with  
their nails, and to tear a black ewe-lamb to pieces with their teeth.  The blood was  
poured into a ditch, that from thence they might charm out the shades of the dead,  
ghosts that were to give them answers.  There was a woollen effigy too, another  
of wax; the woollen one larger, which was to inflict some sort of punishment on  
the little one of wax.  The waxen stood in a suppliant posture, as ready to perish in  
a servile manner.  One of the hags invokes Hecate, the other fell Tisiphone.  Then  
might you see serpents and infernal bitches crawl about them; and the moon with  
blushes withdrawing behind the lofty monuments, that she might not be a witness  
to these infamous doings.—But if I lie, even a little, about this affair, may my  
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head be contaminated with the white filth of ravens; and may Julius, and the  
effeminate Miss Pediatius, and the knave Voranus come to urine upon me and  
befoul me.  Why should I mention every particular? viz. in what manner, speaking  
alternately with Sagana, the ghosts uttered dismal and piercing shrieks; and how  
clandestinely they hid in the earth a wolf’s beard, with the teeth of a spotted  
snake;  and how great a blaze flamed forth from the waxen image?  And how I  
was shocked at the voices and actions of these two furies, a spectator however by  
no means incapable of revenge?  For from my cleft bum of fig-tree I let a fart,  
which made as great an explosion as a bursten bladder.  But they immediately ran  
into the city: and then, with exceeding laughter and diversion might you have seen  
Canidia’s artificial teeth, and Sagana’s towering tete of false hair falling off, and  
the herbs, and the inchanted bracelets from her arms.  (Horace 69, 71) 
Leben des Galilei is unique in Brecht’s œuvre in the amount of care the playwright takes 
to explicitly attribute the above satire to its original source.  Brecht’s usual practice is to 
make free use of other texts in his plays, without comment or apology.  He constructs his 
texts, as a matter of course, out of pre-existing texts.  One critic even suggests that 
“everything in Brecht is plagiarism in one way or another – whether from past or present, 
from other people or classics” (Jameson, Brecht and Method, 133).  One of Brecht’s main 
methods of working was to freely re-invent material from any source that might serve his 
purpose at the moment.  
Such practice, of course, is nothing unusual, because any text, not just those of 
Brecht, “is constructed out of already existent discourse.  Authors do not create their texts 
from their own original minds, but rather compile them from pre-existent texts” (Allen 
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35).  All texts are “plagiarism in one way or another.”  Indeed, the line of argument has 
been drawn further:   
“[Roland] Barthes develops this point into a recognition that the origin of the text  
is not a unified authorial consciousness but a plurality of voices, of other words,  
other utterances and other texts.  If we were able to look inside the head of the  
author – something traditional literary criticism believes is possible by  
interpreting the literary work – then, Barthes’s argument implies, we would not  
discover original thought or even uniquely intended meaning, but what he styles  
as the ‘already-read’, the ‘already-written’.  (Allen 70) 
Thus the author—and this applies absolutely to Brecht—is confined to the intertext, with 
no chance of gaining any degree of freedom.  It is possible for an author to be blissfully 
ignorant of this confinement, and the alternative is for an author to be aware of his or her 
confinement; in the latter case, the author must accept the fact of the confinement—
resign himself or herself to it—and continue working, continue producing text, within the 
limits of the confinement.  In either case, the only thing the author—even Brecht—can do 
is to keep rewriting the intertext, and it is usual practice—in particular, it is usual for 
Brecht—to simply rewrite the intertext. 
 It is less usual, then, to explicitly name a text’s sources within the text itself (see 
Grimm, Bertolt Brecht: Die Struktur seines Werkes, 42–49 for a discussion of Brecht and 
his intertext).  Yet this is what Brecht does with Horace’s Satire 1.8 in Leben des Galilei.   
 The satire was not a late addition to the play—Brecht already explicitly names 
Horace in the 1938 outline (called version zero in chapter one above) of Leben des 
Galilei, and he retains the explicit allusion in every version, even in the American 
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version, in which, like much of the play, Galileo’s speech about Horace was drastically 
shortened.  In the final version, Galileo’s speech—in scene 8, as part of his conversation 
the short monk—is fully developed (Brecht, Die Stücke von Bertolt Brecht in einem 
Band, 519), and, in scene 13, just before Galileo recants and returns, the short monk 
recounts the allusion to the rest of the party waiting to learn the outcome of the 
inquisition (Brecht, Die Stücke von Bertolt Brecht in einem Band, 531).  And, for good 
measure, Horace’s name is even mentioned again—for the third time—in the following 
scene, in which Galileo says to Virginia, “Ich fühle mich nicht wohl genug.  Lies mir 
etwas Horaz” (Brecht, Die Stücke von Bertolt Brecht in einem Band, 533).  It is 
reasonable to infer that Brecht wanted to make sure that his readers would take note of 
the allusion, which could be the reason why he, contrary to usual practice, explicitly 
named his source. 
If Brecht did indeed make an effort to ensure that his readers would not miss the 
allusion, then a close look at the relation between Brecht’s play and Horace’s satire is in 
order.  The point of Brecht’s allusion to Horace is that the satire has quite a few 
interesting parallels with Leben des Galilei.  First, Priapus, the satire’s narrator, 
corresponds to Galileo.  To see this, notice, first, that the satire’s Priapus is confined in 
his stump of fig-wood; in Brecht’s play, Galileo is confined by the Inquisition.  Thus 
Priapus in the satire and Galileo in the play appear in similar forms—and a character’s 
form of appearance is one of his or her distinguishing features (Propp 84–86).  Another 
distinguishing feature of a character is his or her set of attributes (Propp 87–91), and 
Priapus and Galileo also have similar attributes.  The main attribute of Priapus is that “a 
bloody-looking pole is stretched out from [his] frightful middle” (Horace 69)—a 
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phallus—and this parallels the theme of sensual pleasure as a defining characteristic of 
Galileo.  Indeed, recall, from chapter two above, that Suvin equated Galileo’s appetite for 
food with his insatiable hunger for knowledge; recall, too, that Brecht himself equated 
Galileo’s urge for knowledge directly with sex (Brecht, “Preis oder Verdammung des 
Galilei?” 13, see also Brecht, “Praise or Condemnation of Galileo?” 225).  Finally, 
Galileo’s appetite for food is an inversion of the final, decisive fart of Priapus in the 
satire.  Thus Brecht’s Galileo and Horace’s Priapus have two things in common: first, 
confinement as a form of appearance; second, sensual pleasure as a character attribute.  
There is even a parallel between Horace’s satire and the main subject matter of Leben des 
Galilei, since Priapus’s “fart, which made as great an explosion as a bursten bladder” 
(Horace 71) can be equated with the explosion of a bomb.  
According to the Russian formalists, two characters from two different texts can, 
under three specific conditions, be identified with each other.  Two of the three 
conditions are that, first, the characters should appear in their respective texts in the same 
way (Propp 84–86), and second, that the characters should share a common attribute 
(Propp 87–91)—the common attribute can then serve as a metonymy for each of the two 
characters in his or her respective text, thus making them equal each other because they 
both equal, by metonymy, their shared attribute.  The previous paragraph demonstrates 
that Brecht’s Galileo and Horace’s Priapus have both a form of appearance and an 
attribute in common. 
But forms of appearance and attributes are merely the minor conditions for 
identifying characters.  The ultimate defining feature of a character is the function he or 
she performs in his or her text (Propp 25 et seq.).  In the satire, Priapus has the function 
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of keeping the witches (and thieves, etc.) out of the garden.  In Leben des Galilei, the 
functional parallel is more complicated.  In scene nine of the final version, Galileo first 
easily dismisses Mucius, then sends away Ludovico—the scene ends with Virginia 
accusing Galileo, “Du hast ihn weggeschickt, Vater!” (Brecht, Die Stücke von Bertolt 
Brecht in einem Band, 525).  And, just as Priapus chases away the thieves by virtue of his 
phallus, Galileo vanquishes Mucius and Ludovico by the strength of his knowledge—his 
knowledge, which is one of his several attributes that can be read as being an equivalent 
of Priapus’s phallus (Brecht, “Preis oder Verdammung des Galilei?” 13, see also Brecht, 
“Praise or Condemnation of Galileo?” 225).  However, Galileo’s knowledge alone cannot 
defeat the Church and the Inquisition, just as Priapus’s phallus alone is not enough to 
keep Canidia and Sagana out of the garden. 
This last sentence suggests that religious authority in Leben des Galilei is to be 
equated with the witches in Horace’s satire, and it may be well to briefly justify this 
equation.  In Horace, the witches “turn people’s minds by their incantations and drugs” 
(Horace 69), and, in Brecht, the Church’s ultimate function is to keep the peasants in line 
by manipulating them with faith, which are clear parallels.  Again, Horace’s two witches 
engage with several animals for their witchcraft (Horace 71), and Brecht’s Cardinal 
Bellarmine and Cardinal Barberini wear animal costumes in scene seven, the ball scene, 
where a quick comparison of the play’s three versions shows that Brecht deliberated upon 
the specific animal each Cardinal was to be.  Finally, the witches have “a woolen effigy 
too, another of wax; the woolen one larger, which was to inflict some sort of punishment 
on the little one of wax.  The waxen stood in a suppliant posture, as ready to perish in a 
servile manner” (Horace 71)—up to here, the description could easily be any generic act 
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of oppression.  The reading becomes more specific, though, when, after the witches 
perform a ritual, “how great a blaze flamed forth from the waxen image” (Horace 71)—it 
is at least a possibility that the woollen effigy is the Inquisition, the wax effigy is an 
alleged heretic, and the witches’ play is parallel to the Inquisition first torturing the 
alleged heretic, then burning him or her at the stake. 
Returning to Priapus and Galileo, the parallel between Horace’s satire and 
Brecht’s play becomes complicated when it comes to the two characters’ responses to 
their respective problems.  Priapus’s stump of fig wood explodes open at a crack—his 
wooden body is damaged—and the explosion drives off the witches.  Galileo, in contrast, 
does not take the opportunity to overthrow the Church, electing instead to keep his body 
intact.  This is one way of looking at the comparison, and this reading of the comparison 
serves to drive home the text’s criticism of Galileo’s choice by showing Galileo side to 
side with the image of Priapus, who fulfils his function in Satire 1.8 by sacrificing his 
wooden body.  In the reading of Leben des Galilei as a metaphorical account of modern 
physics, the physicists’ choice leads to the bomb being dropped, resulting in an 
explosion, just as Priapus’s fart is explosive. 
However, there is another way of looking at the comparison between Priapus’s 
explosion and Galileo’s recantation—there are two different possible readings at this 
point.  One reading is discussed in the previous paragraph; in the alternative reading, 
Galileo does perform a sacrifice, but he sacrifices his self-esteem instead of his body—
his ego instead of his physical well-being; the play, being a product of the twentieth 
century, has an open ending, where, in exchange of Galileo’s sacrifice, his book crosses 
the border with Andrea, giving rise to the possibility that science might flourish again 
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some day.  In this alternative reading, Horace’s satire and Leben des Galilei are 
convergent to their very ends. 
There is, as well, a completely different level on which Priapus in Horace’s satire 
and Galileo in Brecht’s play serve the same function:  They might both be standing in for 
their respective authors.  It is possible to read Priapus as Horace himself (see Sharland), 
and Brecht certainly seems to use Galileo as his own voice at several points in the play.  
One definite example of this is Galileo’s line about the Hippocratic Oath for scientists in 
the penultimate scene of the 1955 version; in many other exchanges that end with Galileo 
having the last word—such as, at the end of scene 13, the recantation scene, 
“Unglücklich das Land, das Helden nötig hat” (Brecht, Die Stücke von Bertolt Brecht in 
einem Band, 532)—the last word might be what Brecht himself wants to say.  Thus 
Brecht’s Galileo might equal Horace’s Priapus because each character, in his respective 
text, serves the purpose, external to their respective narratives, of giving voice to the 
opinions of their respective authors.   
One final point:  Horace was an Epicurean—indeed, he was the author of the 
Epicurean motto carpe diem.  Interestingly enough, Galileo’s personal philosophy, as far 
as it is evident in Leben des Galilei, matches Epicureanism in several aspects, such as the 
aversion to physical pain.  
In summary, the satire that Brecht embeds so prominently in the play—by 
explicitly naming Horace three times, in stark contrast to the Brechtian usual practice of 
what can be called “plagiarism” (Jameson, Brecht and Method, 133)—is a replica of the 
play on the smaller scale of 50 lines of Latin verse, because Brecht’s Galileo can be 
equated, using the parameters developed by Propp for equating characters from different 
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texts, with Horace’s Priapus.  Horace’s Satire 1.8 is a scale model of Leben des Galilei, 
only with the closing section inverted, as in a mirror reflection, if Priapus’s explosion is 
read as being parallel to Galileo’s recantation.  If, instead, Priapus’s explosion is 
understood to be parallel to Galileo’s self-condemnation in the penultimate scene, then 
the satire and the play are exact replicas, only differing in scale; in a darker reading, 
Priapus’s explosion can even be read as the explosion of an atom bomb. 
The parallel between the two texts, as a structural feature, is amenable to 
interpretation in two ways.  First, it is possible to read the play as an extended adaptation 
of the satire; second, it allows the satire to be read as a mise en abyme, an image of the 
play, embedded in the play (Chambers 32 et seq.), which calls to mind the sequence of 
progressively smaller images in a pair of parallel mirrors.                 
 
THE MYTHIC CONNECTION 
 The two previous sections both ended with observations that call for further 
interpretation.  The first, comparing Leben des Galilei with texts in which other 
playwrights addressed the problem of the atom bomb, asked by what means Brecht 
manages to generate a measure of hope in his play; the second, comparing Leben des 
Galilei with other texts by Brecht himself, asks why Brecht takes such great care to 
foreground the parallel between his play and Horace’s Satire 1.8, and why he, contrary to 
his own practice, makes an effort to ensure that his readers would not miss his allusion to 
Horace. 
 The two questions have, on the surface at least, nothing in common beyond both 
being questions about Leben des Galilei and both stemming from comparisons of Leben 
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des Galilei with other texts.  The two groups of texts chosen for comparison in the two 
sections are entirely different, and, unsurprisingly, the two resulting questions appear to 
go off in entirely different directions.  The goal of this section is to construct a 
convergence of the apparently unrelated questions of the two previous sections.  The 
convergence consists in a possible common answer to the two questions.  The possible 
common answer comes from a comparison with a third, different group of texts: a cycle 
of Native American myths. 
 The cycle of myths in question is a large body of narratives, collected from 
various tribes throughout both Americas, that are likely to be different surviving 
fragments of a “long native Genesis” (Lévi-Strauss 16).  The full version of the original 
myth being a matter of conjecture, and the surviving fragments, as related by Lévi-
Strauss, being several in number, only one representative version is outlined below, with 
emphasis on the aspects essential for the comparison with Leben des Galilei.  Further 
details, as well as variations, are added where relevant in the remainder of this section. 
 The cycle of myths at question here is about the origin of potters’ clay, and 
features a bird species, the goatsucker, as protagonist.  In the version according to the 
Jivaro, who are traditionally head-hunters and now inhabit the border between Ecuador 
and Peru, the goatsucker, Aôho, used to be a woman.  She was married to both the Sun 
and the Moon, but favoured the Sun.  The Moon, taking offence at this, climbed up to the 
sky on a vine and eclipsed the Sun by blowing on him.  Aôho, in danger of losing both 
her husbands, followed the Moon up the vine, carrying a basketful of clay.  The Moon cut 
the vine in order to get rid of Aôho, who turned into the bird as we know it today.  The 
clay, which was then scattered everywhere, became potters’ clay (Lévi-Strauss 14). 
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In the previous section, an application of Propp’s three parameters—functions, 
forms of appearance, and attributes—led to an identity between Brecht’s Galileo and 
Hprace’s Priapus.  The same method will now extend the identification to also equate the 
Jivaro goatsucker with both Galileo and Priapus.  The main defining feature of any 
character, according to Propp, is the function he or she performs in the plot (Propp 25 et 
seq.); in the Jivaro myth, the goatsucker’s function is to bring potters’ clay to mankind:  
“The clay used in ceremonial jars comes from Aôho’s soul, and women gather it from the 
places where she dropped it during her fall, when she was quickly changing into a 
Goatsucker” (Lévi-Strauss 15).  This parallels both Priapus’ function of securing the 
garden, i.e. a plot of land, from the witches in Horace’s Satire 1.8, and Galileo’s function 
of establishing the true nature of the planet earth for mankind in Leben des Galilei. 
The functional comparison between Brecht’s play, Horace’s satire, and the Jivaro 
myth extend even further.  Priapus secures the garden by means of an explosive fart, 
which is sufficiently associated with annihilation to drive away the two witches.  Galileo, 
as discussed in the previous section, acts contrarily, in that he abdicates his function of 
securing the truth about earth and sky, thus preventing self-annihilation, but, in exchange, 
also passing up his opportunity to annihilate the authority; in the alternative reading, 
Galileo secures his physical body by annihilating his self-esteem; in the metaphorical 
reading, it is the earth that is annihilated, and the annihilation is caused by the bomb.   
The goatsucker of the Jivaro myth does the exact opposite, because it is an origin myth, 
which is the opposite of annihilation. And, while it does not directly address the creation 
of the world, it is about the origin of potter’s clay, which is made of the same material as 
the world. 
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 While a character’s plot function is his or her main defining feature, it is not the 
only one.  A second defining feature is the way the character appears in the narrative 
(Propp 84–86).  As pointed out in the previous section, Galileo’s ultimate form of 
appearance in Leben des Galilei is confinement in house arrest by the Inquisition, and 
Priapus’ initial form of appearance in Satire 1.8 is confinement in the stump of fig wood.  
In comparison, the goatsucker in the Jivaro myth is ultimately confined to the earth—
away from the sky, because “Moon saw her, and, to get rid of her forever, he cut the vine 
that was linking the two worlds [of earth and sky]” (Lévi-Strauss 14).  Thus the Jivaro 
goatsucker matches both Brecht’s Galileo and Horace’s Priapus not only in function, but 
also in form of appearance. 
 The third and final defining feature of a character is his or her set of attributes 
(Propp 87–91).  These could include both physical attributes and accessories—objects 
associated with the character—which can all combine to together define the character by 
metonymy.  The previous section’s comparison between Leben des Galilei and Satire 1.8 
is more complicated when it comes to attributes than it is for either functions or forms of 
appearance, because Galileo in Brecht’s play and Priapus in Horace’s poem have not 
identical, but related and opposite attributes—Galileo has a prodigious appetite, “Galilei 
aß gern gut” (Brecht, Die Stücke von Bertolt Brecht in einem Band, 499), whereas 
Priapus emits a loud fart to frighten away the witches Canidia and Sagana.  But a 
comparison of the texts of Brecht and Horace with the goatsucker cycle provides a 
resolution of the opposition, because the goatsucker is, in different parts of the cycle, 
endowed with both of the attributes.  Appetite as an attribute of the goatsucker is, in fact, 
highlighted in the cycle—“The mythology draws … especially on [the goatsucker’s] 
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grasping and gluttonous nature, displayed in three kinds of appetites or feelings: avarice, 
jealousy, and envy, which are often designated by the same name in the languages of the 
so-called primitive people” (Lévi-Strauss 35), which establishes an equation between the 
goatsucker and Brecht’s Galileo.  The connection with Priapus is best established by 
considering a group of North American variations on the myth:  
“[T]hey all start with a quarrel between the Trickster (a deceiving half-god) and a  
rock endowed with speech and movement.  The causes of the quarrel do not vary  
much from one version to the next: the Trickster has given his blanket, his shirt,  
or his knife to the rock and now wants them back because it is about to rain or  
because he needs the knife to cut his meat; the Trickster had given the rock a  
blanket soiled with excrement, but, now that it has been cleaned by its new owner,  
he would like to have it back; the Trickster steals the blanket from the rock or else  
he relieves himself on the rock and soils it.  The rock has no use for robbers or  
litterers.  He also thinks that one cannot give something and then take it back.   
The Blackfoot version contains the following maxim:  “What was given to the  
great rocks can never be taken back.”  So the rock starts rolling, chasing after the  
Trickster, catches up with him, and traps him under his huge weight.  Summoned  
by the cries of the victim, several animals come to his rescue, but they all get  
killed by the rock; or else the victim calls directly to the Goatsuckers (…).  The  
last bird he implores manages to shatter the rock, almost always by farting  
violently.  (Lévi-Strauss 65) 
Both Priapus in Horace’s Satire 1.8 and the goatsucker solve the problems in their 
respective texts by farting, which establishes their equation, and this equation completes 
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the identification of Leben des Galilei, Satire 1.8, and the goatsucker myth cycle.  In fact, 
the North American version also features a direct connection between the goatsucker’s 
violent fart and the atom bomb in the metaphorical reading of Leben des Galilei.  In 
summary, the three protagonists—Brecht’s Galileo, Horace’s Priapus, and the goatsucker 
in the cycle of Native American myths—are identical in Propp’s three criteria of 
function, form of appearance, and attribute.    
Curiously, the North American version even includes a parallel to Dürrenmatt’s 
Die Physiker—the Blackfoot maxim, “What was given to the great rocks can never be 
taken back”, matches the end result of Dürrenmatt’s play, as spoken by Möbius, that 
“Was einmal gedacht wurde, kann nicht mehr zurückgenommen werden” (Dürrenmatt 
85).  
But the connection of the Brecht and Horace texts with the Native American 
myths also performs another function:  It suggests a reason why Leben des Galilei needed 
the classical literary allusion to Horace in the first place.  As noted above, the eating and 
the farting are related and opposite attributes, and the mythology only manages to unite 
the two attributes in their protagonist by exploiting the freedom of giving the same 
character different attributes in different versions of the myth.  A literary text, whether 
Brecht or Horace, has only one version.  This means it would normally be restricted to 
giving its protagonist only one of the two opposite attributes.  But one technique that can 
still create room for both of the attributes is to include a second text within the main text, 
giving the protagonist of the main text one attribute, and giving the protagonist of the 
second, included text the opposite attribute.  This is precisely what happens in Leben des 
Galilei—in the main text, Galileo is associated with eating, but he is also equated with 
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Priapus of Satire 1.8, and Priapus is associated with farting, thus creating a full parallel to 
the myth cycle, complete with opposite attributes, which would normally be impossible 
in a literary text with a unique version.  This, then, could be an answer to the question, 
raised at the end of the previous section, about the purpose of Brecht’s painstaking 
foregrounding of his Horatian intertext.               
 Of course, the myth cycle does not really unite the opposite attributes, but rather 
uses the opposite attributes, separated from each other, in two different versions of the 
myth.  But precisely that convergence of opposites is the entire goal of mythology, 
according to the structure originally proposed by Lévi-Strauss, “the form through which a 
given mythic material seeks to transform a problematical starting point into a satisfactory 
solution” (Jameson, Prison-House of Language, 161).  
 And the same structural peculiarity of mythology—that it is, essentially, a 
machine that can “transform a problematic starting point to a satisfactory solution” 
(ibid.)—could be an answer to the question raised about the first section of the present 
chapter, the question about the means by which Brecht creates a sense of hope at the end 
of Leben des Galilei, or at least creates an open ending, where other playwrights, such as 
Dürrenmatt, Max Frisch, or Ionesco, could write nothing beyond absurdity, despair, 
darkness, hopelessness on the theme.  The means Brecht brings to bear on the problem is 
the structure of mythology.  The reason why he is successful is that, as Lévi-Strauss 
demonstrates, the structure of mythology is machine that is custom-built for the specific 
purpose of resolving impossible problems. 
 In conclusion, it is highly improbable that Brecht ever even heard of the cycle of 
Native American myths about the goatsucker.  One must ask, then, why there should be 
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structures characteristic of mythology in Brecht’s play.  This is the question addressed in 
the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: WHY MYTHIC STRUCTURE IN LEBEN DES GALILEI? 
 The mythic side of Leben des Galilei has an interesting contrast in certain 
writings of Antonin Artaud (1896–1948).  Artaud was deeply impressed by a Balinese 
performance, which was mythic in nature (Artaud 53–67); yet when he wrote manifestos 
for theatre—he wrote two manifestos (Artaud 89—100, 122–132)—he did not make use 
of the deep structure of myths.  Brecht, on the other hand, does have mythic structure in 
Leben des Galilei, as seen in the previous chapter; yet his theoretical writings do not so 
much as mention myth. 
It is not as though the mythic did not receive explicit mention in Brecht because 
Brecht did not spend time on theory.  He did, but the thrust of his theoretical writings is 
different:  He spent his career developing the theory and methods of epic theatre.  A brief 
summary of epic theatre is given below for easy reference. 
 Elements of epic theatre appeared in Brecht’s work at least as early as the one-act 
play Die Kleinbürgerhochzeit (1919, but not premiered until 1926; Brecht, Die Stücke 
von Bertolt Brecht in einem Band, 907–920), of which a commentator remarks, “Das 
Stück ist kalt zu spielen.  Es erfordert eine innerliche Nichtbeteiligung des Schauspielers, 
der seine ganze Aufmerksamkeit auf das zu richten hat, was er macht.  Es ist in der Tat 
voller Epik, voller Verfremdung, lange ehe diese Begriffe im Vokabular Brechts 
auftauchen” (Melchinger, “Das Theater des jungen Brecht,” 62).  The two differences 
between a tendency and a technique are: first, an author is conscious about his or her 
techniques, but not necessarily conscious about his or her tendencies; second, an author 
follows his or her techniques with intention, but might follow his or her tendencies 
unintentionally.  Brecht’s tendency of the “innerliche Nichtbeteiligung des 
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Schauspielers” (ibid.) developed, fairly rapidly, into a technique.  By the time Brecht 
applied it to Aufstieg und Fall der Stadt Mahagonny (1930; Brecht, Die Stücke von 
Bertolt Brecht in einem Band, 203–226), he was sufficiently sure of his new technique 
that he announced it in a theoretical note about the opera—this, then, marks the point 
where the new technique ceased to be experimental and solidified into a final form, into a 
theory.  Brecht named his technique epic theatre, and defined it by outlining the ways in 
which it differed from the prevalent theatre.  He listed the differences, as a scientist might 
do, in tabular form.  The table, in full, is this: 
Table 1: Epic Theatre, As Distinct from Dramatic Theatre, According to Brecht 
Dramatische Form des Theaters Epische Form des Theaters 
  
Die Bühne “verkörpert” einen Vorgang sie erzählt ihn 
verwickelt den Zuschauer in eine Aktion und macht ihm zum Betrachter, aber 
verbraucht seine Aktivität weckt seine Aktivität 
ermöglicht ihm Gefühle erzwingt von ihm Entscheidungen 
vermittelt ihm Erlebnisse vermittelt ihm Kenntnisse 
der Zuschauer wird in eine Handlung 
hineinversetzt 
er wird ihn gegenübergesetzt 
es wird mit Suggestion gearbeitet es wird mit Argumenten gearbeitet 
die Empfindungen warden konserviert bis zu Erkenntnissen getrieben 
der Mensch wird als bekannt vorausgesetzt der Mensch ist Gegenstand der 
Untersuchung 
der unveränderliche Mensch der veränderliche und verändernde Mensch 
Spannung auf den Ausgang Spannung auf den Gang 
eine Szene für die andere jede Szene für sich 
die Geschehnisse verlaufen linear in Kurven 
natura non facit saltus facit saltus 
die Welt, wie sie ist die Welt, wie sie wird 
was der Mensch soll was der Mensch muß 
seine Triebe seine Beweggründe 
das Denken bestimmt das Sein das gesellschaftliche Sein bestimmt das 
Denken 
(Brecht, Schriften zum Theater, 116–117; see also Szondi 116–117, Bentley 43–44) 
It is possible to visually represent epic theatre as a triangle—let us call it ∆𝐴𝐵𝐶—with 
the audience at vertex A, the Brechtian actor at vertex B, and the character the actor is 
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playing at vertex C.  In other words, the audience, the actor, and the character remain at 
some distance from one another, separated, as though they were, by the three side lengths 
of the triangle they form.  The actor does not become his or her character, and members 
of the audience do not identify with either the actor or the character.  The play consists of 
the actor, firmly planted at vertex B, pointing out the character fixed at vertex C to the 
viewer, effectively saying, “Look, over there is the character!”  The viewer watches 
everything—both the actor and, as a completely separate entity, the character—from the 
safe distance of vertex A.  The creation of the three distances between the triangle’s three 
vertices is Brecht’s famous Verfremdungseffekt.  The distance between the viewer and the 
character enables the viewer to genuinely see the character, rather than merely gawking at 
the character, and then the effect is even further magnified if the viewer happens to 
recognize a reflected image of himself or herself in the character (Haus, “Gedanken vor 
einer Inszenierung des Leben des Galilei 1988 in den USA,” 22). 
Perhaps because he intended Leben des Galilei to be his final statement, Brecht 
even integrated the distinction between seeing and gawking into its text, as a recent 
commentator points out:  “In seinem Jahrzehnten später erstandenen Theatertext Leben 
des Galilei greift er das Sehen - jetzt akzentuiert als Erkenntnismittel – wieder auf und 
konfrontiert es erneut mit dem Begriff ‘Glotzen,’ also einem begrifflosen Blick der an der 
Oberfläche verbliebenden Anschauung” (Vaßen, “‘Jeder sollte sich von sich selbst 
entfernen.’ – Fremdheit und Verfremdung bei Bertolt Brecht,” 202; see also Torby 96).  
Finally, the status of the resulting seeing, as distinct from gawking, as “Erkenntnismittel” 
makes it possible for the theatre to function as a medium of education, i.e. makes possible 
the Brechtian Lehrstück. 
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 In the same note—about Aufstieg und Fall der Stadt Mahagonny, the note where 
he tabulated the differences between dramatic theatre and epic theatre—Brecht also 
addressed the question of what music suits epic theatre: 
Table 2: The Music of Epic Theatre, As Distinct from the Music of Dramatic Theatre 
Dramatische Oper Epische Oper 
  
Die Musik serviert Die Musik vermittelt 
Musik den Text steigernd den Text auslegend 
Musik den Text behauptend den Text voraussetzend 
Musik illustrierend Stellung nehmend 
Musik die psychische Situation malend das Verhalten gebend 
(Brecht, Schriften zum Theater, 118–119; see also Bentley 44) 
The tabulated differences, of course, only directly address the music that Kurt Weill 
(1900–1950) wrote for Aufstieg und Fall der Stadt Mahagonny.  But the music for Leben 
des Galilei, written by Hanns Eisler (1898–1962), also matches both the guidelines set 
out in the last table and, generally, the epic theatre.  An article about a recent production 
of the play with Eisler’s original music mentions, among other things, “the quality of the 
songs as lessons” (Henderson 123), “a melodic line based on sol mi la, a quote of the 
childhood taunting tune, and an alienation effect” (Henderson 123), and “a repeated 
rising perfect fourth, reminiscent of another childhood taunt, and another example of the 
alienation effect” (Henderson 125).  Thus the music is included as an essential part in the 
theory of epic theatre, and, in Leben des Galilei, it contributes to the Verfremdungseffekt 
and to the play’s quality of being a Lehrstück.  Of course, beyond the text and the music, 
other aspects of the production, such as costume and make-up, can also contribute to 
Verfremdungseffekt, and productions of Brecht’s plays often take pains in those 
departments as well (see, for example, Barrier 128). 
 In Brecht’s system, epic theatre produced Verfremdungseffekt as one of its 
defining consequences.  One of the means by which Brecht’s the system constructed epic 
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theatre was the acting technique of Gestus.  A Gestus is a well-chosen gesture the actor 
foregrounds in the portrayal of a character.  The Gestus becomes representative, by 
means of metonymy, either of the character, or of the character’s relationship to another 
character.  The term is not Brecht’s invention, but rather dates at least as far back as the 
18th century (see, for example, Lessing, paragraph 7), but Brecht re-invented it and 
developed it into an identification symbol of his epic theatre.  In a celebrated example 
from Mutter Courage und ihre Kinder (1941; Brecht, Die Stücke von Bertolt Brecht in 
einem Band, 541–578), “when Mother Courage bites on the coin offered by the recruiting 
sergeant and, as a result of this brief interval of distrust, loses her son, she demonstrates 
at once her past as tradeswoman and the future that awaits her - all her children dead in 
consequence of her money-making blindness” (Barthes 73)—Gestus is a gesture that 
affects the entire course of events of a play.  Brecht himself explained how Galileo’s 
behavior toward Andrea in the opening scene of Leben des Galilei functions as Gestus to 
determine the outcome of the two characters’ final meeting in the play’s penultimate 
scene (Brecht, Brecht on Theatre, 198–200).  More specifically—more specific because 
Gestus is not uniquely specified by a Brecht’s relatively permissive texts, but rather 
created afresh by each actor—effective use of Gestus was crucial in multiple ways in the 
construction of Charles Laughton’s Galileo for the play’s American production (Maclean 
80, 89; see also Brecht, Collected Plays, 253 for one way Laughton revised his Gestus 
between the Beverly Hills production and the New York production).   
Brecht’s collaboration with Laughton, while important to both men’s separate 
artistic developments, ended on a sour note with the New York production (see, for 
example, Neilson 290 et seq.).  Brecht wrote a poetic denunciation of Laughton in the 
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form of an epitaph, even though he would himself pre-deceased Laughton by six and a 
half years: 
Speak of the weather 
Be thankful he’s dead 
Who before he had spoken 
Took back what he said.  (Neilson 296) 
Thus, even the means Brecht uses to condemn Laughton in the epitaph is a Gestus—the 
gesture of failing to be true to one’s word. 
And the practice of Gestus, indeed its importance, did not die with Brecht’s death.  
Gestus, being relatively transcultural by nature—more transcultural, for example, than 
music, which Brecht discusses in the table quoted above—has also proved crucial to 
successful contemporary productions of Brecht in new cultural contexts beyond the ones 
originally visualized by Brecht, such as in Brazilian Portuguese (Heeg 267 et seq.).  
Separately, work with Gestus continued in the Berliner Ensemble (Maclean 90) and in the 
work of Heiner Müller (1929–1995) (Maclean 93 et seq., Mumford 46).  Of particular 
interest, in view of the substance of this thesis, is Heiner Müller’s development of Gestus 
in the specific direction of intertextuality:  “What Müller substitutes in place of a linear 
sequence is history, not history as story, but history as intertextuality or as quotation, 
what Müller calls ‘Zitatgestus’ or ‘Gestus of quotation’” (Maclean 93)—Müller took the 
Brecht’s intertextual tendency—as analyzed in chapter three above—and turned it, by 
practising it consciously and with intent, into his own technique of Zitatgestus.  In 
particular, Zitatgestus is one example of a post-Brechtian technique that originated in 
later experiments with Brecht’s technique of Gestus. 
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 The above are some of Brecht’s own thoughts on theatre and some of the ways he 
practised it.  As mentioned at the beginning of the present chapter, in Brecht’s theory, the 
entire topic of myth is conspicuous by its absence.  The question remains, then, why 
Leben des Galilei has the mythic structure demonstrated in the previous chapter. 
 And the answer may lie in the universal, primitive nature that has been 
hypothesized for mythic thought (see, for example, Jameson, Prison-House of Language, 
111 et seq.; see also Lévi-Strauss 191), which makes it at least consistent that a text, if 
worked out to a state of completion, would ultimately feature mythic structure.  That is, 
because Brecht worked on Leben des Galilei for twenty years, the play necessarily had to 
arrive at something that is universal in nature; the play has the mythic structure because 
mythic structure is the universal structure at which the play arrived—this is a possible 
answer to the question of the present chapter.   
And, working in the opposite direction, one could try to draw conclusions using 
the existence of mythic structure in Leben des Galilei as the starting point.  The Native 
American myth cycle and Brecht’s play are two texts that developed independently of 
each other.  After extensive reworking—after three versions spread out over two decades 
for Brecht, after oral retelling over generations in different Native American tribes for the 
myth cycle—the same structure appears in both texts.  This might be evidence of the 
existence of archetypes of texts, and Leben des Galilei might belong to the same 
archetype as the goatsucker myth.  
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Appendix: Horace’s Satire 1.8 




Conqueritur Priapus Esquilinum montem veneficarum incantationibus infestari. 
Olim truncus eram ficulnus, inutile lignum :  
Cum faber incertus scamnum faceretne Priapum, 
Maluit esse Deum.  Deus inde ego, furum aviumque  
Maxima formido ; nam fures dextra coercet,  
5 Obscœnoque ruber porrectus ab inguine palus : 
Ast inportunas volucres in vertice harundo  
Terret fixa, vetatque novis considere in hortis.  
Huc prius angustis eiecta cadavera cellis  
Conservus vili portanda locabat in arca.  
10 Hoc miseræ plebi stabat commune sepulcrum,  
Pantolabo scurræ, Nomentanoque nepoti.  
Mille pedes in fronte, trecentos cippus in agrum  
Hic dabat ; heredes monumentum ne sequeretur.  
Nunc licet Esquiliis habitare salubribus, atque  
15 Aggere in aprico spatiari ; quo modo tristes  
Albis informem spectabant ossibus agrum :  
Cum mihi non tantum furesque, feræque suetæ  
Hunc vexare locum, curæ sunt atque labori,  
Quantum carminibus quæ versant atque venenis  
20 Humanos animos. has nullo perdere possum  
Nec prohibere modo, simul ac vaga luna decorum  
Protulit os, quin ossa legant, herbasque nocentis.  
Vidi egomet nigra succinctam vadere palla  
Canidiam, pedibus nudis, passoque capillo,  
25 Cum Sagana maiore ululantem. pallor utrasque  
Fecerat horrendas adspectu. scalpere terram  
Unguibus, et pullam divellere mordicus agnam  
Cœperunt. cruor in fossam confusus, ut inde  
Manis elicerent, animas responsa daturas.  
30 Lanea et effigies erat altera cerea : maior  
Lanea, quæ pœnis conpesceret inferiorem.  
Cerea suppliciter stabat, servilibus, ut que  
Iam peritura, modis. Hecaten vocat altera, sævam  
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Altera Tisiphonen. Serpents, atque videres  
35 Infernas errare canes ; lunamque rubentem,  
Ne foret his testis, post magna latere sepulcra.  
Mentior at siquid, merdis caput inquiner albis  
Corvorum ; atque in me veniat mictum atque cacatum  
Iulius, et fragilis Pediatia, furque Voranus.  
40 Singula quid memorem ? quo pacto alterna loquentes  
Umbræ cum Sagana resonarint triste et acutum? 
Utque lupi barbam variæ cum dente colubræ  
Abdiderint furtim terries, et imagine cerea  
Largior arserit ignis ? et ut non testis inultus  
45 Horruerim voces Furiarum et facta duarum ?  
Nam, displosa sonat quantum vesica, pepedi  
Diffissa nate ficus, at illæ currere in urbem ;  
Canidiæ dentis, altum Saganæ caliendrum  
Excidere, atque herbas, atque incantata lacertis  
50 Vincula, cum magno risuque iocoque videres. 
 
From pages 68 and 70 of Horace’s The Works of Horace, translated by C. Smart, vol. 2, 
T. Carnan, 1780. 
